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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON POVERTY REDUCTION IN MYANMAR 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
KYU KHIN GAR 
 
This dissertation studies the effect on poverty in Myanmar of policies such as 
relaxing rice export licensing restrictions and implementing the national 
minimum wage. In addition, this study discovers the effect on poverty of 
traditional betel-quid chewing.  
Chapter one studies the impact of export liberalization on household welfare, 
using the policy of relaxing rice export licensing restrictions. The study 
mainly exploits the difference-in-differences (DD) method to identify the 
policy impact. Results show that the policy has a positive impact on rice 
production, through increased use of agricultural inputs such as labour and 
chemical fertilizer. Increased rice production leads to higher consumption 
among rice-cultivating households. However, other households - such as 
rural landless households, urban households, and non-export-crops 
cultivating households reduce consumption due to higher rice prices. Thus, 
only rich rice-cultivating households benefit from the policy and adverse 
effects are concentrated on poor households. We conclude, therefore, that the 
rice export liberalization policy hurts household welfare at the aggregate 
level.  
ii 
 
Chapter two studies the impact of the national minimum wage introduction on 
enterprise-level employment in Myanmar, using the difference-in-differences 
method. Results suggest that the minimum wage introduction raises 
enterprises’ average-monthly labour cost, which leads to decreased 
employment and then to increased investment in machinery and equipment. 
We find no discernible effects on profit as enterprises raise labour 
productivity. Small enterprises also take the burden of higher labour costs 
resulting from the minimum wage introduction, although they are legally 
exempt from enforcement.  
Chapter three examines the impact of chewing betel-quid on poverty 
incidence, using Myanmar data. To address the potential endogeneity in a 
household’s decision on chewing betel-quid, we use household and 
community characteristics as instruments. 2SLS results suggest that chewing 
betel-quid exacerbates poverty through the direct channel - crowding-out 
effects of betel-quid consumption and associated health expenditure - and the 
indirect channel - loss of participation in the household workforce due to 
illness.   
Keywords: Export liberalization; Rice; Household welfare; Minimum wage; 
Labour cost; Employment; Betel-quid; Poverty; Myanmar  
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
IMPACT OF EXPORT LIBERALIZATION ON HOUSEHOLD 
WELFARE: EVIDENCE FROM RELAXING LICENSING 
RESTRICTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The agricultural export restriction policies implemented in many countries after 
the global food crisis in 2007-08 - including imposing export bans or 
embargoes, taxes, quotas, and license restrictions - was to ensure food security, 
reduce domestic food prices, stabilize markets and protect consumer welfare 
(Abbott, 2011). Nevertheless, export restriction policies were short run policies 
and may not provide desired outcomes in the medium to long term (Aragie, 
Pauw, & Pernechele, 2018; Diao, Kennedy, Mabiso, & Pradesha, 2016; 
Porteous, 2017) and lead to more price fluctuations in domestic markets (K. 
Anderson & Nelgen, 2012).  
Existing empirical evidence suggests that market liberalization improves the 
welfare of poor households through stabilizing prices in the long run (Ahmed, 
1988; Myers, 2006; Winters, McCulloch, & McKay, 2004). The more farmers 
engage with export markets, the more benefit they will get through higher prices 
and production (Balat, Brambilla, & Porto, 2009; Hertel & Reimer, 2005). 
However, the higher food prices associated with export liberalization policies is 
a matter of concern because higher food prices will reduce real income and 
consumers’ welfare, particularly in poor households (Swinnen, 2011).  
The effect of agricultural market liberalization on household welfare is never 
clear although trade theorists have studied on the subject for a long time 
(Hoekman, Michalopoulos, Schiff, & Tarr, 2001; Litchfield, Mcculloch, & 
Winters, 2003). A general conclusion is that net welfare gains of export 
liberalization policy relies on net sale position of households’ benefits, while 
net buyers - rural landless households and urban households - lose (J. E. 
Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004; Mellor, 1978). 
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Some research has investigated the effect of export restriction policies, but a 
disproportionate number of articles study the effect of export liberalization. 
Coello (2009) studies the impact of import tariff reductions by importing 
countries on the welfare of farmers in exporting countries. Results show that a 
1% decrease in tariffs in importing countries leads a 0.17% increase in 
production and a 124% increase in the average income of households 
cultivating export crops. Minot & Goletti (1998) investigate the impact of 
eliminating rice export quotas in Vietnam on household welfare by using a 
multimarket spatial-equilibrium model. Findings reveal that the policy of 
removing rice export quotas would raise prices but the incidence and severity of 
poverty would reduce.  
This paper investigates the effects of relaxing agricultural export licensing 
restrictions on production and household welfare by holding import policies 
constant. Further, in several respects we build on the two research findings 
discussed above. First, we study the policy impacts on both producer, 
rice-cultivating households, and consumer households, rural landless 
households, urban households and non-export-crops cultivating households. 
Second, we explore the underlying mechanism of policy impacts on 
rice-cultivating households. Finally, we explore the differential impacts of 
export liberalization on different types of households.   
To investigate the impact of relaxing export licensing restrictions on 
rice-cultivating households, we hypothesize that rice farmers will expand 
production by increasing use of agricultural inputs in response to higher farm 
gate prices for rice. Increased rice production then leads to higher consumption 
in rice-cultivating households. To study the impact on other households, we 
hypothesize that increased rice sector labour demand will create employment for 
rural landless households and then study whether the gains from employment 
growth would help rural landless households to offset higher rice price 
associated with the export liberalization.  
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The study mainly uses a difference-in-differences approach to identify the 
policy impacts by using three household surveys. Results indicate that the 
policy has a positive effect on rice production through the increase in 
agricultural inputs used. The increase in rice production further leads to higher 
consumption in rice-cultivating households. Although the policy creates 
employment for rural landless households, the gain from employment growth is 
not large enough to offset the higher staple food prices associated with export 
liberalization. The policy also harms welfare of urban households and 
non-export-crops cultivating households.   
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. We provide a detailed overview 
of the institutional context of the rice market and export liberalization policies 
in Myanmar in section 1.2. Section 1.3 presents the estimation framework and 
data we used in this study. In section 1.4, we describe the impacts of the policy 
on production and consumption of rice-cultivating households followed by the 
differential impacts on different types of household in section 1.5. Section 1.6 
turns to the issue of identification assessment. We discuss the policy impact on 
household welfare at the aggregate level in section 1.7, and section 1.8 
concludes.  
1.2 Institutional Background  
Agriculture is the core of Myanmar’s economy. 55.3% of the national labour 
force is employed in the agriculture sector, and 77.8% of agriculture labour 
works in the rice sector. (Myanmar, Mininistry of Labour Immigration and 
Population, 2017). Agriculture is 10.09% of exports, and rice accounts for 9.1% 
of the total agricultural exports. Rice accounts for approximately 50% of total 
food intake in lower-income families and 25% in families with higher incomes 
(The World Bank, 2017). 
As rice is a staple food in Myanmar, the rice market has been distorted over 
decades by different policies. Myanmar has implemented broad-based structural 
market reforms in agriculture since the early 2000s. During the first market 
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liberalization, from 1988 to 2002, pulses and maize markets were liberalized but 
rice markets remained under government control. In the second agricultural 
market liberalizations, in 2003-2008, government abandoned compulsory 
procurement, withdrew from rice exporting, and allowed private investors to 
participate in the rice export market.  
Immediately after the global food crisis in 2007-08, government restricted rice 
exports by imposing constraints on licensing processes. In 2008, rice export 
licenses were granted only to Rice Specialized Companies (RSCs) involved in 
the rice supply chains development and conducting contract farming with rice 
farmers. To be eligible for an export license, RSCs had to submit a contract 
farming record to the Ministry of Commerce with the approval of the local 
authority. Requirements of contract farming included providing quality seeds, 
fertilizers and mechanized services to rice farmers at low interest rates. 
In April 2011, government abandoned the policy of granting export licenses to 
RSCs. After the changes, any trader could get an export license regardless of 
contract-farming records. Thus, RSCs lost privileges in rice exports and the 
market became more competitive, with RSCs share falling sharply as many 
traders entered the export market and farm gate prices for rice increased as 
shown in Figure 1-1. 
Figure 1-1: RSCs’ Export Share and Farm Gate Price 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organization of Myanmar 
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1.3 Data 
We use data from three household surveys conducted by the United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. UNDP conducted 
two-round household surveys - Integrated Household Living Conditions 
Assessment (IHLCA) in 2009 and 2010. The IHLCA surveys are nationwide 
quantitative surveys, which collected detailed information on household 
demographic characteristics, housing, education, health, consumption 
expenditures, household assets, employment, business, and finance from 18,660 
households. The survey's first round was conducted in December 2009 and the 
second round in May 2010. The survey used a stratified sampling design with 
62 districts and two townships across all district as the first-stage-sampling 
units. Wards from urban areas and villages from rural areas were randomly 
taken from the selected townships in accordance with the numbers of 
households in the second stage. Finally, to select twelve households from each 
ward or village in the selected township, the survey uses Probability 
Proportionate to Estimated size with Replacement (PPES). 
World Bank conducted the Myanmar Poverty and Living Conditions Survey 
(MPLCS) in 2015. The MPLCS is also a nationally representative survey and 
the sample design was developed based on the sampling frame on 2014 Census 
pre-enumeration list data. The survey used a stratified multi-stage sample 
design and the probability of proportional to size (PPS) was used for EAs. The 
sample within the EAs was selected from master sample by using random 
systematic sampling with equal probability and EAs’ coverage are the same as 
the district level. The questionnaires in the MPLCS survey were based on the 
IHLCA.  
To study the effects of rice export liberalization policy on production, we use 
plot information such as type of crops, quantity harvested, size of the plot, crop 
harvested by season, land tenure types, and access to irrigation. For household 
welfare, we use information such as household consumption expenditure. The 
plot level information and households’ socio-economic characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1.1 of panels A and B respectively.    
	
6 
 
Table 1-1:Summary Statistics 
Notes: 1 US$ approximately equals to 1,300 Kyats (Local Currency) in 2010.  
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Plot level     
Crops yield per acre (Kilogram) 740.99 668.75 0 4076.8 
Dummy for harvest season (Wet season=1) 0.434 0.496 0 1 
Dummy for land type (Lae=1) 0.318 0.466 0 1 
Dummy for access to irrigation (Yes=1)  0.257 0.437 0 1 
Dummy for land tenure (Own=1) 0.595 0.491 0 1 
Observations 14187 
Panel B: Household level 
Per capita food expenditure per day (Kyats) 2472.743 1433.075 26.874 35343.81 
Per capita non-food expenditure per day (Kyats)  207.508 1170.698 0 88046.96 
Per capita total expenditure per day (Kyats) 2679.568 1922.256 26.874 90525.43 
Dummy for chemical fertilizer use (Yes=1) 0.657 0.475 0 1 
# of hired labour used (Person-days) 48.51 126.88 0 2760 
# of acre of agricultural land, a household own 8.205 10.610 0.1 180.5 
Household head gender (Male=1) 0.788 0.409 0 1 
Household head education (Years of schooling) 5.641 3.513 0 19 
# of household members 1.538 1.537 1 18 
# of children aged <=5  0.321 0.579 0 6 
# of seniors aged 65+ 0.301 0.570 0 3 
# of household members got sick in recent 3 
months 
0.549 0.970 0 11 
Average annual rainfall at regional level 
(millimeter) 
2333.884 2072.573 633 20229 
Mean maximum temperature at regional level 
(Celsius) 
33.087 2.378 23.1 35.2 
Mean elevation at regional level (Meter) 216.637 379.745 11 1570 
Dummy for rural landless households 0.282 0.450 0 1 
Dummy for urban households 0.255 0.436 0 1 
Dummy for rice-cultivating households 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Dummy for export-crops cultivating households 0.108 0.310 0 1 
Dummy for non-export-crops cultivating 
households 
0.144 0.351 0 1 
Dummy for paddy region (Yes= A region in 
which the share of rice sown acre is more than 
10% of total rice sown acre in the country) 
0.328 0.469 0 1 
Observations 16771 
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1.4 Effects on Rice-cultivating Households 
As the rice export licensing policy affects only the rice sector, we first explore 
the effects of rice export liberalization on production and consumption 
expenditures of rice-cultivating households. We hypothesize that rice farmers 
will expand production by increasing use of agricultural inputs, and then the 
increased rice production leads to higher spending on food and non-food 
consumption. 
To explore the policy impact on production, we used the plot-level data. Our 
estimation strategy is to compare the relative change in yield per acre of rice 
plot and the plots cultivated at least of the five export crops—that is, groundnut, 
green gram, sesame, pigeon pea, and black gram. We can plausibly use the five 
export crops as a reference because the export market for the five export crops 
has been liberalized since 2002 and the policy affects only the rice market. To 
investigate the effects on agricultural input use and household consumption, we 
use household level data. We compare agricultural input use and household 
consumption in the pre-policy intervention to post policy intervention between 
rice-cultivating households and households cultivating at least one of the five 
export crops (hereafter export-crops cultivating households).  
The validity of our identification strategy relies on an assumption that implies 
farmers will not switch crop after the policy change. One possible argument is 
that when rice farm gate prices increase, other crops farmers might switch to 
rice if the return from cultivating rice is higher than other export crops. Since 
we use the pooled cross-section data, we cannot control for the potential 
endogeneity in farmers’ cropping decisions. In practice, it is less likely to be the 
case for a number of reasons e.g., differences in crop nature, evidence from 
national statistics of crops sown acre, and the estimates from Ordinary Least 
Squared (OLS) regression.  
Firstly, the nature of rice is very different from each of the five export crops 
because rice is a water intensive crop but the export crops used in this study are 
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water sensitive crops. The soil content of rice plots must contain at least 50% 
clay texture to be able to hold water for a certain period of time. The export 
crops can only be cultivated at plots with good drainage, therefore, those plots 
must contain sandy and loam soil content. The clay texture plots tend to be 
poorly drained, which can cause crops’ root rot and blossom fall.  
Secondly, we analyse the trends in crops sown area during the study period 
(2010-2015) by using national statistics. As shown in Figure 1-2, rice-sown 
acre at national level slightly decreased while the sown acre of export crops 
remained unchanged after RSCs lost export preference from government.  
Figure 1-2: National Sown Acres for Selected Crops 
 
Source: Myanmar Central Statistic Organization 
Finally, we investigate whether farmers switch to rice by conducting before and 
after analysis with ordinary least squared (OLS) estimates. The OLS estimates 
show that there is no significant change in rice-sown acre at the household level 
before and after the policy change (Reported in appendix table A-1)    
1.4.1 Effects on Rice Output and Inputs 
We hypothesize that the rice market became more competitive after the policy 
intervention and rice farm gate prices increased as shown in Figure 1-1. As 
farmers are profit maximisers, higher rice prices are a good incentive to expand 
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production by using more agricultural inputs. To identify the policy impact on 
consumption in rice-cultivating households, we first investigate the effect on 
rice production by using plot level data. As the policy affects only the rice 
market, this allows us to apply a difference-in-differences approach. To explore 
the causal impact on rice production, we compare rice yield per acre with five 
export crops by taking advantage of time variations. We use the following plot 
level equation to examine the policy impact on rice production:  
𝑌!!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!"#$ + 𝑋!!!"! 𝛽! + 𝑍!!"! 𝛽! +
𝐼!"! 𝛽!+𝛿! + 𝜀!!!", (1.1)   
where 𝑖, ℎ,  𝑗 and 𝑡 denotes plot, household, district, and year respectively. 
"𝑌!!!"" denotes the natural log rice output per acre. “𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡” is a dummy 
variable, which equals one for the year 2015 and 0 otherwise. “𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑡” is a 
dummy variable in which 1 specifies rice plots, and 0 takes at least one of the 
five export-crops plots. “𝑋!!!"” denotes plot characteristics including land type, 
access to irrigation, tenure type, harvest season; “𝑍!!"! ” represents household 
characteristics including the natural log of total acres of land a household 
owned, household head’s education and sex, # of household members, # of 
children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 65+, # of household members who were 
sick in the last three months, dummy for agricultural input use; and 
“𝐼!"!  " indicates regional characteristics including the annual mean level of 
rainfall, mean level of maximum temperature and mean level of elevation. In 
addition, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects "𝛿!" . "𝜀!!!" ” 
denotes the random disturbance. 
Column (1) of Table 1.2 shows estimates from equation (1.1) and results 
indicate that rice output per acre increases after rice export licensing restrictions 
has been relaxed. The coefficient of the interaction term “Post * Treat_Plot” in 
column (1) indicates that rice production per acre increased 71.7 percent on 
average in 2015 compared to the yield per acre of five export-crops plot.  
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Agricultural specialists agree that the key to agricultural productivity is the use 
of agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizers. The yield gap between Asia 
and Africa can be clarified by the different levels of agricultural input use 
(Morris, Kelly, Kopicki, & Byerlee, 2007). Poor farmers are present bias 
although they are rational profit optimizers; therefore, they fail to make use of 
the seemingly profitable investment in fertilizers (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 
2011).  
To explore a causal mechanism underlying the increase in rice production, we 
analysed the relative increase in agriculture input use, such as labour and 
chemical fertilizer, pre-policy and post-policy intervention between 
rice-cultivating households and export-crops cultivating households. We use the 
following equation to estimate the effects on household agricultural input use 
and consumption expenditure: 
𝑌!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐻𝐻 + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽!+𝐼!"! 𝛽! + 𝛿! +  𝜖!!", (1.2)  
where ℎ,  𝑗 and 𝑡 denote household, district, and year respectively. "𝑌!!"” 
denotes a set of outcome variables such as the dummy for household chemical 
fertilizer use, the natural log of number of hired labourers measured in 
person-days, the log of household total expenditure, food consumption and 
non-food consumption expenditure, which are adjusted with the household age 
composition and household size (economies of scale). “𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡” is an indicator 
that takes one for the year 2015, and 0 otherwise. “𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝐻𝐻” is a dummy 
variable in which one specifies rice households, and 0 indicates export-crops 
cultivating households. “𝑋!!"” represents household characteristics including 
the natural log of total acres of land a household owned, household head’s 
education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of 
seniors aged 65+, # of household members who were sick in the last three 
months, and "𝐼!"! " includes regional characteristics including the annual mean 
level rainfall, the mean level maximum temperature, and the average elevation. 
In addition, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects "𝛿!".  
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Estimates for agricultural input use are reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 
1.2. We discover consistent results with prior research, which suggest 
agricultural productivity is positively correlated to labour and agricultural inputs 
(Amare, Denno Cisse, Jensen, & Shiferaw, 2014).  
Table 1-2: Impacts on Rice Output and Inputs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log of yield 
per acre 
Dummy for 
chemical 
fertilizer use 
Log of number 
of hired-labour  
    
Post (After relaxing restrictions)  -0.052 0.615*** 2.736*** 
 (0.309) (0.105) (0.705) 
Dummy for Treated plot (Rice plot=1) 1.078***   
 (0.155)   
Post * Treated plot (Rice plot=1) 0.717**   
 (0.320)   
Dummy for Treated HH 
(Rice-cultivating HH=1) 
 -0.014 0.274*** 
 (0.041) (0.095) 
Post * Dummy for Treated HH  0.119* 1.366*** 
  (0.061) (0.329) 
Plot controls Yes No No 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8324 5041 5041 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations in column (1) is a plot and in columns (2) and (3) households. The 
periods are 2010 and 2015. The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural log of yield per acre, 
in column (2) is a dummy variable that equals one if the household uses chemical fertilizer and zero 
otherwise, and in column (3) is the nature log of hired labour measured in person-day. “Post” is an 
indicator, which equals zero for the year 2010, and one for the year 2015. The dummy for treated plot 
equals one for rice plot and zero for at least one of five other export crops (Groundnut, sesame, black 
gram, green gram, and pigeon pea). The dummy for treated households equals one for 
rice-cultivating households and zero for export- crops cultivating households. 
“Plot controls” includes dummy for land type, dummy for access to irrigation, dummy for land tenure 
type, and dummy for harvest season. “Household controls” includes the natural log of total acre of 
land owned, household head’s education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # 
of seniors aged 65+, # of household members who were sick in the last three months, and dummy for 
agricultural inputs use. “Regional controls” includes log of annual mean level rainfall, mean level 
maximum temperature, and average elevation. In all regressions, we control for district-year two-way 
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) exclude dummy for household agricultural inputs use from 
“Household controls”.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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The coefficient of the interaction “Post * Treat_HH” in column (2) indicates 
that the probability of chemical fertilizer use in rice-cultivating households 
increase 11.9 percent relative to export-crops cultivating households after the 
policy intervention. Column (3) reports estimates for the hired-labour use, 
which is measured by person-day. The coefficient of interest of the interaction 
term in column (3) shows that hired labour in rice-cultivating households 
increased by 136.6 percent relative to their counterparts after the policy 
intervention. 
1.4.2 Effect on Consumption Expenditure 
To explore the effect on consumption expenditure, we use the Difference-in- 
Differences framework. We compare the relative change in household total 
expenditure, food expenditure and non-food expenditure before and after the 
policy intervention between rice-cultivating households and export-crops 
cultivating households.  
Total expenditure on household consumption is calculated by adding the 
spending on food and non-food consumption. Food expenditure is calculated by 
multiplying the total quantity of food items consumed by a household and the 
price deflated by Paasche price index (PPI). The PPI represents the variation of 
both price and quantity consumed over space and time. Non-food expenditures 
include the household’s non-food consumption expenditures and rent 
expenditures, but exclude spending on health from non-food because it is most 
often a shock response and generally does not enhance a household’s welfare. 
It is essential to adjust for household composition and size (scale economies) to 
compare spending across households. Household composition adjustment takes 
into account that children in a household consume less than adults because they 
have lower caloric needs and they have more restricted items to consume. To 
adjust the economies of scale across households, we take account of the “public 
goods” aspect of some items consumed by households e.g., housing, television, 
etc., whereby consumption by one household member does not reduce the 
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amount available to another person in the same household. We use equation 
(1.3) to adjust the household adult equivalent scales for household food 
consumption expenditure: 
𝐴𝐸𝐹! = ( 𝑀𝐴! +  𝛼!𝐹𝐴! +  𝛼!𝐶!)!,                   (1.3) 
where “𝐴𝐸𝐹! ” is the number of adults equivalent for food consumption 
expenditure in household “j”, “𝑀𝐴!” denotes the number of male-adults aged 
15+ in household “j”, “𝐹𝐴!” presents female-adults aged 15+ in household “𝑗”, 
“𝐶! ” denotes the number of children aged <=14 in household “𝑗”, “𝛼!” 
represents the cost of a female adult relative to that of a male adult, “𝛼!” 
represents the cost of a child relative to that of a male adult, “θ” is an elasticity 
of adult equivalents with respect to effective size. 𝛼!,𝛼!, and 𝜃 are set to 0.9, 
0.7 and 0.9 respectively based on nutrition norms (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002).  
In order to compare non-food consumption expenditure across households, we 
use equation (1.4) to adjust the household economies of scale: 
 𝐴𝐸𝑁𝐹! = ( 𝐴! +   𝛼𝐶!)!,                          (1.4) 
where “𝐴𝐸𝑁𝐹!” is the number of adult equivalents for non-food consumption 
expenditure in household “j”, “𝐴!” denotes the number of adults aged 15+ in 
household “j”, “𝐶!” denotes the number of children aged <=14 in household “j”, 
“𝛼” represents the non-food cost of a child relative to that of a male-adult, “𝜃” 
is an elasticity of adults equivalent with respect to effective size between 0 and 
1. 𝛼  and 𝜃 are set to 0.3 and 0.9 respectively based on nutrition norms 
(Deaton & Zaidi, 2002).   
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Table 1-3: Effects on Rice-cultivating Household Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variables are natural log of 
household expenditure 
Total 
expenditure 
Food 
expenditure 
Non-food 
expenditure 
    
Post (After relaxing restrictions)  1.494*** 1.446*** 2.611*** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.108) 
Dummy for Treated HH 
(Rice-cultivating HH=1) 
-0.319*** -0.325*** 0.001 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.029) 
Post * Dummy for Treated HH 0.133** 0.120* 0.095 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.084) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5305 5305 5305 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations is a household. The periods are 2010 and 2015. “Post” is an 
indicator variable, which equals zero for the year 2010, one for the year 2015. The dummy for treated 
households equals one for rice-cultivating households and zero indicates export-crops cultivating 
households. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) are the natural log of total expenditure, food 
expenditure and non-food expenditure respectively, which are adjusted for household composition and 
household size (economies of scale).  
“Household controls” include the natural log of total acres of land owned, household head’s education 
and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, number of seniors aged 65+ and # of 
household members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” include log of the 
annual mean level rainfall, the mean level maximum temperature, and the average elevation. In all 
regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
We use equation (1.2) to explore the impacts of the export liberalization policy 
on household consumption and the results are presented in Table 1.3. Columns 
(1)-(3) provide estimates of household total expenditure, food expenditure and 
non-food expenditure. In all regressions, we control for household 
characteristics including the natural log of total acres of land owned, household 
head’s education and sex, number of household members, number of children 
aged <=5, number of seniors aged 65+, number of household members who 
were sick in the last three months; and regional characteristics including the 
annual mean level rainfall, mean level maximum temperature and the average 
elevation. In addition, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects in all 
regressions.  
The coefficient of the interaction “Post * Treated HH” in column (1) reveals 
that total expenditure in rice-cultivating households increase 13.3 percent 
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relative to export-crops cultivating households after relaxing rice export 
licensing restrictions, in column (2) indicates that household expenditures on 
food increase 12 percent, however, there is no impact on non-food consumption 
relative to their counterparts after the policy change. The efforts to increase 
production in a household with a higher composition of rice relative to other 
crops may not be the same as a household with lower rice composition. To 
allow the differential impact of policy on crops composition, we use a 
continuous treatment - acres of plot that is cultivable rice a household owns 
(Reported in appendix table A-2). Results are consistent with our baseline 
estimates.  
1.5 Effect on Different Types of Household  
In this section, we investigate the policy impact on agricultural employment in 
rural landless households. Then, we study whether the gain from employment 
growth is large enough to offset the higher food prices associated with export 
liberalization, particularly in rural landless households. We also study the 
impacts of rice export liberalisation on other households, such as urban 
households and non-export-crops cultivating households. 
1.5.1 Effect on Employment in Rural Landless Households 
The spillover effects of an agricultural policy are crucial to economic growth 
(World Bank, 2008). Hornbeck and Keskin (2015) note that wages for 
agricultural workers increase due to increased production and McCulloch, 
Winters, and Cirera (2001) suggest that trade liberalization tends to create job 
opportunities if the policy affects a labour-intensive sector and will increase 
wages and employment. 
We hypothesize that the increase in rice sector labour demand due to increased 
production will create employment for rural landless households. To investigate 
the effect on employment in rural landless households, we use equation (1.5): 
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𝑌!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!! + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽! + 𝐼!"! 𝛽! + 𝛿! + 𝜖!!",
 (1.5)  
where "ℎ" denotes a household in district “j” and "𝑡" represents year. “𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡” 
is an indicator that takes one for the year 2015 and 0 otherwise. "𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!!" is a 
dummy variable in which one specifies rural landless households, and 0 
indicates export-crops cultivating households. In all regressions, we control for 
district-year two-way fixed effects "𝛿!". "𝑋!!"" includes a set of household 
characteristics and "𝐼!"! " indicates regional characteristics. 
Table 1.4 presents estimates from equation (1.5). The coefficient of the 
interaction term “Post × Treat_hh” indicates that agricultural working days in 
landless households increase by 60.3 percent relative to export-crops cultivating 
households after the policy change.  
Table 1-4: Effects on Employment in Rural Landless Households 
 (1) 
 Log of number of 
agricultural working 
days 
Post (After relaxing restrictions) 0.900*** 
 (0.099) 
Dummy for treated HH (Rural landless HH=1) -1.618*** 
(0.052) 
Post * Treated HH 0.603*** 
(0.106) 
Household controls Yes 
Region controls Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes 
Observations 6540 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations is a household. The periods are 2010 and 2015. “Post” is an 
indicator variable, which equals zero for the year 2010, one for the year 2015. The dummy for treated 
households equals one for rural landless households and zero for export-crops cultivating households. 
The dependent variable is the log of number of agricultural working days in rural landless households.  
“Household controls” include the natural log of total acres of land owned, household head’s education 
and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 65+, and # of household 
members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” include the log of the annual 
mean level rainfall, the mean level maximum temperature, and the average elevation. In all 
regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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1.5.2 Effect on Consumption Expenditure of Different Types of Households 
There is much empirical research that investigates the impacts of export 
liberalization policy, however, there is no general consensus on the policy 
impacts on household welfare. One of the key underlying mechanisms of the 
impact of export liberalization policy on household welfare is the price change 
(Deaton, 1989). In the case of increased prices resulting from export 
liberalization, net sellers (e.g., rice-cultivating households) would be better off 
while net buyers (e.g., urban households and rural landless households) would 
be worse off (Mellor, 1978; Swinnen, 2011).  
On the other hand, agricultural expansion may create employment especially for 
rural landless households (Irz, Lin, Thirtle, & Wiggins, 2001). A number of 
empirical studies identified the connection between agricultural development 
and household welfare through employment growth in both the agricultural and 
non-agricultural industries (Coxhead & Warr, 1991; De Franco & Godoy, 
1993). As we found, export liberalization creates employment for rural landless 
households and they may benefit from employment growth. Nevertheless, 
higher staple food prices associated with export liberalization may offset the 
gain from employment growth. To investigate whether gains from employment 
growth outweigh the losses from higher prices, we explore the policy impact on 
consumption expenditures in rural landless households. In addition, we explore 
the effects on consumption expenditure in urban households and 
non-export-crops cultivating households by using the following equation: 
𝑌!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑅𝐿!! + 𝛽!𝑈!! +  𝛽!𝑅!! + 𝛽!𝑁𝐸𝑥𝑝!! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐿!! +
𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑈!! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑅!! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽!" + 𝐼!"! 𝛽!! +
 𝛿!+ 𝜖!!", (1.6)  
where ℎ, 𝑗, and 𝑡 denote household, district, and year respectively. “𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡” is 
an indicator that takes one for the year 2015 and 0 otherwise. 𝑅𝐿!!, 𝑈!!, 𝑅!! and 
𝑁𝐸𝑥𝑝!! are dummy variables in which one specifies rural landless households, 
urban households, rice-cultivating households, and non-export-crops cultivating 
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households respectively, and 0 indicates export-crops cultivating households 
(Detailed information for household classifications are reported in appendix 
table A-3). "𝑋!!"" indicates household characteristics and "𝐼!"" is a set of 
regional characteristics. In all regressions, we also control for district-year 
two-way fixed effects "𝛿!".  
A possible threat to the identification strategy is that the increase in rice prices 
may affect the consumption expenditure of export-crops cultivating households 
used as a reference group in this study. If this is the case, the baseline estimates 
will be biased. However, our assumption - that the effect of higher rice prices 
on consumption expenditure of the reference household is negligible- is 
plausible for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, although rice-cultivating households benefit from the production 
expansion they also consume rice, so the increase in rice prices may negatively 
affect them. As we apply the Difference-in-Differences setting to estimate the 
policy impacts, the negative effects on both treated group and control group will 
cancel each other out. Secondly, we compare the distribution of total 
expenditures of export-crops cultivating households before and after export 
liberalization to assess whether the increase in rice prices affects the 
consumption expenditures. The distributions of total expenditures of 
export-crops cultivating households are very similar before and after the export 
liberalization as shown in Figure 1-3. 
Estimates from equation (1.6) are reported in Table 1.5. The specification in 
columns (1)-(3) presents the effects of the export liberalization policy on 
household total expenditures, food expenditures and non-food expenditures 
respectively. The coefficients of the first interaction “Post * Treated HH (Rural 
landless HH)” in columns (1)-(3) indicates that total consumption expenditures, 
food expenditures and non-food expenditures in rural landless households 
decrease by 40.20 percent, 39.3 percent, and 67.6 percent respectively relative 
to export-crops cultivating households after the policy intervention.  
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Table 1-5: Effects on Household Consumption  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Log of total 
expenditure 
Log of food 
expenditure 
Log of 
non-food 
expenditure 
    
Post (After relaxing restrictions)  1.064*** 1.172*** -0.603*** 
 (0.075) (0.082) (0.136) 
Dummy for treated HH (Rural landless 
HH=1) 
0.217*** 0.193*** 0.006 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.107) 
Dummy for treated HH (Urban HH=1) 0.150** 0.119* 0.092 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.078) 
Dummy for treated HH (Rice-cultivating 
HH=1) 
-0.415*** -0.410*** -0.161** 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.066) 
Dummy for treated HH (Non-export-crops 
cultivating HH=1) 
0.129*** 0.071 0.715*** 
(0.048) (0.047) (0.085) 
Post * Treated HH (Rural landless HH) -0.402*** -0.393*** -0.676*** 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.138) 
Post * Treated HH (Urban HH) -0.248** -0.230** -1.031*** 
 (0.094) (0.099) (0.123) 
Post * Treated HH (Rice-cultivating HH) 0.203*** 0.193*** 0.143 
(0.068) (0.072) (0.114) 
Post * Treated HH (Non-export-crops 
cultivating HH) 
-0.556*** -0.491*** -0.783 
(0.075) (0.068) (0.572) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16771 16768 16771 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations is a household. The periods are 2010 and 2015. “Post” is an 
indicator, which equals zero for the year 2010, and one for the year 2015. The dummy for treated 
households equals one for rice-cultivating households, rural landless households, urban households, 
and non-export-crops cultivating households and zero indicates the export-crops cultivating 
households. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) are the natural log of total expenditure, food 
expenditure, and non-food expenditure respectively, which are adjusted for household composition 
and household size (economies of scale).  
“Household controls” include the natural log of total acres of land owned, household head’s 
education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 65+, and # of 
household members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” include the log of 
the annual mean level rainfall, the mean level of maximum temperature, and the average elevation. 
In all regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Findings suggest that benefits from new agricultural employment is not large 
enough to offset the higher food price. Since farm income is lumpy and has a 
significant time gap, rural households may need to depend on non-farm revenue 
to ease consumption and spending (Bryceson, 1999; Ellis, 1998; Masanjala, 
2006). 
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The coefficient of the interaction “Post * Treated HH (Urban HH)” shows that 
total consumption expenditures, food expenditures and non-food expenditures 
in urban households decrease on average by 24.80 percent, 23 percent and 
103.10 percent respectively. Total expenditure and food expenditure in 
non-export-crops cultivating households also decrease by 55.60 percent and 
49.10 percent respectively, however, there is no impact on non-food 
expenditure.  
We find consistent results for the impact on rice-cultivating households. The 
coefficient for Post * Treated HH (Rice households) indicates that total 
expenditures, and food expenditures increase by 20.30 percent, and 19.30 
percent respectively, but there is no significant impact on non-food 
consumption. 
Figure 1-3: Distribution of Total Expenditure in Export-crops cultivating 
Households (Comparison between before and after export liberalization) 
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1.6 Assessing the Identification Strategy 
1.6.1 Falsification Test 
The validity of our baseline estimates depends on the assumption of a parallel 
trend of the outcome variable between the treatment group and control group. It 
means that the difference in outcome variables between the ‘treatment’ and 
‘control’ group would be constant over time in the absence of treatment.  
Table 1-6: Falsification Test 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of 
crop 
yield 
per 
acre 
Input Use  Consumption Expenditure 
 Dummy for 
chemical 
fertilizer 
use (Yes=1) 
Log of 
number of 
hired labour  
 Log of total expenditure 
Log of 
food 
expenditure 
Log of 
non-food 
expenditure 
Post * Treated 
plot (Rice plot=1) 
0.259       
(1.50)       
Post * Treated 
HH (Rice- 
cultivating HH) 
 -0.113 -0.264  -0.006 0.008 0.056 
 (0.070) (0.181)  (0.047) (0.042) (0.094) 
Post * Treated 
HH (Rural 
landless HH) 
    -0.046 -0.024 -0.279 
    (0.046) (0.041) (0.174) 
Post * Treated 
HH (Urban HH) 
    -0.078 -0.046 -0.278 
    (0.054) (0.046) (0.233) 
Post * Treated 
HH (Non-export- 
crops HH) 
    -0.013 0.012 -0.154 
    (0.048) (0.042) (0.167) 
Plot controls Yes No No  No No No 
Household 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District-year 
two-way FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16498 10919 10701  30530 30529 29715 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 districts). 
The unit of observations in column (1) is a plot and columns (2)-(6) is a household. The periods are 2009 
and 2010. “Post” is an indicator, which equals zero for the year 2009 and one for the year 2010. The dummy 
for treated plot equals one for rice plot and zero for at least one of five other export crops (Groundnut, 
sesame, black gram, green gram, and pigeon pea). The dummy for treated households equals one for rural 
landless household, urban household, rice-cultivating households and non-export-crop cultivating 
households respectively, and zero indicates export-crops cultivating households. The dependent variable in 
column (1) is the natural log of yield per acre, in column (2) is the dummy for household chemical fertilizer 
use, in column (3) is the natural log of number of hired labour measured in Person-days and in columns (4)-(6) are 
the natural log of total expenditure, food expenditure, and non-food expenditure respectively, which are adjusted 
for household composition and household size (economies of scale). 
“Plot controls” includes dummy for land type, dummy for access to irrigation, dummy for land tenure type, 
and dummy for harvest season. “Household controls” includes the natural log of total acre of land owned, 
household head’s education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 
65+, and # of household members who got sick in last recent three months. “Regional controls” includes the 
log of the annual mean level rainfall, the mean level of maximum temperature, and the average elevation. In 
all regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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To support the validity of our baseline estimates, we conduct a falsification test 
by introducing a pseudo policy change in 2010 instead of 2011. We use two 
household surveys conducted before the policy intervention. If there is an 
existing difference between treatment group and control group before the policy 
intervention, the pseudo policy change must catch the difference between the 
two groups and the coefficient of the interaction term would be statistically 
significant. We find no evidence of difference in main outcomes between the 
treatment group and control group in the pre-policy intervention. The results are 
presented in Table 1.6. 
1.6.2 Robustness Check 
The Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation method is widely used to 
measure the impact of a policy change on the outcome variables of interest. By 
using the DD estimation method, we can eliminate endogenous effects of time 
and place on the outcome variables. If the outcome variable is determined by 
different variations such as policy affected groups, time and places, we can 
apply the triple difference-in-differences (DDD). The DDD estimation method 
can reduce bias and provide accurate estimates of the policy change.  
To implement a triple Difference-in-Differences setting, we follow the paper by 
Bleakley (2007), which studied the impact of the eradication of hookworm 
disease on economic performance in the American South. They identified 
treatment with the variations in the pre-treatment infection rates across regions. 
The idea is that pre-program intervention areas with higher levels of hookworm 
infection will benefit more compared to low-infection areas. In our study, we 
implement additional treatment and control groups based on the intensity of 
rice-sown acres in a region. We defined a treated region, in which the share of 
regional rice sown acreage is above 10 percent of national rice sown acre 
(hereafter rice region) in 2010. We assume a region with higher intensity of 
rice-sown area will benefit more from the export liberalization policy. We use 
the following equation to estimate the policy impact:  
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𝑌!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑇!"#$%& +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 +   𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑇!"#$%& + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑇!"#$%& +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑇!"#$%& + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽! + 𝐼𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽9 +
 𝛿! + 𝜖!!", (1.7) 
where ℎ, 𝑗, and 𝑡 indicate household, district, and year respectively. “𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡” is 
an indicator that takes one for the year 2015 and 0 otherwise. "Treat" is a 
dummy variable in which, in column (1), one indicates the rice plot and zero 
indicates at least one of the five export-crops plot, in columns (2)-(6) one 
denotes rural landless households, urban households, rice-cultivating 
households and non-export-crops cultivating households and zero indicates 
export-crops cultivating households. 𝑇!"#$%&  is a dummy variable where 1 
indicates rice regions and 0 otherwise. "𝑋ℎ𝑗𝑡′ ” denotes household characteristics 
including the natural log of total acres of agricultural land a household owned, 
household head’s education and sex, number of household members, number of 
children aged <=5, number of seniors aged 65+, number of household members 
who were sick in the last three months; and "𝐼!"! ” indicates regional 
characteristics including the log of the annual mean level of rainfall, the mean 
level of maximum temperature and the average elevation. In addition, we 
control for district-year two-way fixed effects "𝛿𝑗" in all regressions. 
The estimates from equation (1.7) are reported in Table 1.7. The coefficients of 
the triple interaction term “Post * Treated household * Treated region” 
indicates the impacts of export liberalization policy on rice production, 
agricultural inputs use, total consumption expenditure, food expenditure, and 
non-food expenditure. The estimates in triple DD setting are slightly different 
with baseline estimates but they are robust, consistent and statistically 
significant.  
In addition, we conduct another robustness check by using information from all 
three household surveys. Table 1.8 reports the robustness checks of the baseline 
estimates. Results verify that the estimates by using information from all three 
surveys support the validity of the baseline estimates.   
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Table 1-7: Robustness Check (Triple DID) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log of 
crop yield 
per acre 
Input Use  Consumption Expenditure 
 Dummy 
for 
chemical 
fertilizer 
use 
(Yes=1) 
Log of 
number 
of hired 
labour  
 Log of total expenditure 
Log of 
food 
expenditure 
Log of 
non-food 
expenditure 
Post * Treated 
region * Treated 
plot 
1.191***       
(0.410)       
Post * Treated 
region * Treated 
HH (Rice HH=1) 
 0.224** 1.159**  0.430*** 0.414*** 0.242* 
 (0.111) (0.517)  (0.124) (0.137) (0.140) 
Post * Treated 
Region * Treated 
HH (Rural landless 
HH=1) 
    -0.371*** -0.430*** -0.500** 
    (0.099) (0.110) (0.189) 
Post * Treated 
Region * Treated 
HH (Urban HH=1) 
    -0.355** -0.255** -1.146*** 
    (0.136) (0.121) (0.188) 
Post * Treated 
Region * Treated 
HH (Non-export- 
crop HH=1) 
    -0.289*** -0.274** -0.168 
    (0.102) (0.109) (0.104) 
Plot controls Yes No No  No No No 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District-year 
two-way FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18183 11980 11785  34178 34177 33363 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations in column (1) is a plot and columns (2)-(6) is a household. The periods 
are 2009, 2010 and 2015. “Post” is an indicator, which equals zero for the years 2009 and 2010, and one 
for the year 2015.  The dummy for treated plot equals one for rice plot and zero for at least one of five 
other export crops (Groundnut, green gram, sesame, black gram and pigeon pea). The dummy variable for 
treated region equals one if the share of rice sown acres in a region is above 10% of total rice sown acre of 
the country. The dummy for treated households equals one for rural landless household, urban household, 
rice-cultivating households, and non-export-crops cultivating households respectively, and zero indicates 
export-crops cultivating households. The dependent variables in column (1) is the natural log of yield per 
acre, in column (2) is the dummy for household chemical fertilizer use, in column (3) is the natural log of 
number of hired labour measured in person-days, and in columns (4)-(6) are the natural log of total 
expenditure, food expenditure and non-food expenditure respectively, which are adjusted for household 
composition and household size (economies of scale). 
“Plot controls” includes dummy for land type, dummy for access to irrigation, dummy for land tenure 
type, and dummy for harvest season. “Household controls” includes the natural log of total acre of land 
owned, household head’s education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors 
aged 65+, and # of household members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” 
include the log of the annual mean level rainfall, the mean level of maximum temperature, and the average 
elevation. In all regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 1-8: Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Log of 
crop 
yield 
per acre 
Input Use  Consumption Expenditure 
 Dummy for 
chemical 
fertilizer use 
(Yes=1) 
Log of 
number 
of hired 
labour  
 Log of total expenditure 
Log of 
food 
expenditure 
Log of 
non-food 
expenditure 
Post * Treated plot 
(Rice plot=1) 
0.989***       
(3.99)       
Post * Treated HH 
(Rice HH) 
 0.101** 1.214***  0.310*** 0.238*** 0.058 
 (0.048) (0.354)  (0.062) (0.077) (0.090) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Rural landless HH) 
    -0.266*** -0.277*** -0.743*** 
    (0.066) (0.068) (0.121) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Urban HH) 
    -0.159* -0.182* -1.173*** 
    (0.083) (0.098) (0.118) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Non-export-crops 
cultivating HH) 
    -0.314*** -0.361* -0.906* 
    (0.067) (0.191) (0.454) 
Plot controls Yes No No  No No No 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
District-year 
two-way FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18183 11980 11785  34178 34177 33363 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 
districts). The unit of observations in column (1) is a plot and columns (2)-(6) is a household. The periods 
are 2009, 2010 and 2015. “Post” indicator variable, which equals zero for the years 2009 and 2010, and 
one for the year 2015. The dummy for treated plot equals one for rice plot and zero for at least one of five 
other export crops (Groundnut, green gram, sesame, black gram and pigeon pea).  The dummy for treated 
households equals one for rural landless households, urban households, rice-cultivating households and 
non-export-crops cultivating households respectively, and zero indicates the export-crops cultivating 
households. The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural log of yield per acre, in column (2) is the 
dummy for household chemical fertilizer use, in column (3) is the natural log of the number of hired 
labour measured in person-days and in columns (4)-(6) are the natural log of total expenditure, food 
expenditure and non-food expenditure respectively, which are adjusted for household composition and 
household size (economies of scale). 
“Plot controls” include dummy for land type, dummy for access to irrigation, dummy for land tenure type, 
and dummy for harvest season. “Household controls” include the natural log of total acres of land owned, 
household head’s education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, number of seniors 
aged 65+, and # of household members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” 
include the log of the annual mean level of rainfall, the mean level of maximum temperature, and the 
average elevation. In all regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
1.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects of Export Liberalization 
To explore the differential effects of higher food prices on poor and non-poor 
households, we perform extra experiments. We partition households into five 
quintiles based on household total expenditure. Table 1.9 reports the 
heterogeneous effects of the export liberalization policy on household 
expenditures. The findings show the impact of export liberalization masks 
significant differences on household socio-economic conditions. The coefficient 
of the interaction term “Post * Treated HH” indicates that the negative effects are 
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mostly concentrated in poor households which is consistent with previous studies 
(Ivanic & Martin, 2008; Wodon & Zaman, 2009) and richer rice-cultivating 
households only benefit from the export liberalization policy (Nicita, 2009).  
Table 1-9: Heterogeneous Effects on Household Expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1st 
Quintile 
2nd 
Quintile 
3rd    
Quintile 
4th  
Quintile 
5th 
Quintile 
Panel A: The dependent variable is the natural log of household food expenditure 
Post * Treated HH (Rural 
landless HH) 
-0.403*** -0.403*** -0.187* -0.051 0.242 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.096) (0.081) (0.292) 
Post * Treated HH (Urban HH) -0.340*** -0.340*** -0.021 0.096 0.002 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.095) (0.092) (0.089) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Rice-cultivating HH) 
0.091 0.091 0.145 0.180** -0.002 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.099) (0.070) (0.137) 
Post * Treated HH (Non-export- 
crop cultivating HH) 
-0.249*** -0.249***    
(0.079) (0.079)    
N 3213 3213 4044 4446 4634 
Panel B: The dependent variable is the natural log of household non-food expenditure 
Post * Treated HH (Rural 
landless HH) 
-0.357* -0.357* 0.090 -0.326*** -0.284 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.182) (0.101) (0.213) 
Post * Treated HH (Urban HH) -0.223 -0.223 -0.314 -0.509*** -0.532** 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.219) (0.124) (0.216) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Rice-cultivating HH) 
-0.184 -0.184 0.086 0.042 0.016 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.107) (0.091) (0.227) 
Post * Treated HH (Non-export- 
crop cultivating HH) 
0.800 0.800    
(0.514) (0.514)    
N 3628 3628 4200 4581 4698 
Panel C: The dependent variable is the natural log of household total expenditure 
Post * Treated HH (Rural 
landless HH) 
-0.479*** -0.479*** -0.216** -0.041 -0.148 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.094) (0.074) (0.181) 
Post * Treated HH (Urban HH) -0.308*** -0.308*** -0.049 0.094 0.039 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.091) (0.087) (0.077) 
Post * Treated HH 
(Rice-cultivating HH) 
0.077 0.077 0.116 0.181*** 0.085 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.095) (0.064) (0.117) 
Post * Treated HH (Non-export- 
crop cultivating HH) 
-0.303*** -0.303***    
(0.075) (0.075)    
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3215 3215 4045 4446 4634 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 districts). 
The dependent variables in panels (A)-(C) are the natural log of food expenditure, non-food expenditure and 
total household expenditure respectively, which are adjusted for household composition and household size 
(economies of scale). We partition households into five quintiles based on total consumption expenditure.  
“Household controls” include the natural log of total acres of land owned, household head’s education and 
sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 65+, and # of household members 
who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” includes the log of the annual mean level rainfall, 
the mean level of maximum temperature, and the average elevation. In all regressions, we control for 
district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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1.7 Welfare Analysis 
The causal impacts of the policy observed by using empirical techniques are 
only intermediate inputs. The ultimate question of interest is: what is the 
welfare impact of the policy? To calculate the net welfare impact of the 
relaxation of export licensing restrictions, we run regressions on the absolute 
value of the household consumption expenditures instead of the natural log 
(Reported in appendix table A-4).  
The findings indicate that the total household expenditure per capita per day in 
rice-cultivating households increased by 684.838 Kyats on average while for 
rural landless households, urban households, and non-export-crops cultivating 
households it decreased by 647.984 Kyats, 384.332 Kyats, and 669.541 Kyats 
respectively. We weight total consumption expenditure by using the percentage 
of different households in the economy—that is, 28% rural landless households, 
25% urban households, 21% rice-cultivating households, 15% non-export-crops 
cultivating households, and 11% export-crops cultivating households to 
calculate the net welfare impact of the policy. Overall, per capita consumption 
expenditure per day decreased on average by 234.134 Kyats (approximately 
0.18 USD) after the policy intervention. (Reported in appendix table A-5 for 
detailed calculations). To calculate the net welfare impact, we assume the 
higher rice prices may not affect consumption expenditure of reference 
households. If it is not the case, the negative impacts of the export liberalization 
policy are underestimated; however, we found a minimum negative welfare 
impact of the policy. 
Our findings in this paper contradict the results of Minot and Goletti’s paper. 
One of the possible explanations is that if the domestic price is lower than the 
world price before the export liberalization, then the suppliers will be able to 
sell their product worldwide at the world price after the export liberalization. As 
long as the world price is higher than the domestic price, suppliers will continue 
to sell in the world market rather than the domestic market until domestic prices 
reach world prices. As rice is a staple food and the price elasticity of demand is 
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close to zero in Myanmar, domestic demand may not change at higher prices. 
The percentage of rice households is 21 percent of the total households in the 
economy; therefore, losses in consumer surplus may outweigh gains in producer 
surplus. 
Even rice producers, particularly smallholder farmers, may not benefit as they 
are not net sellers. Smallholder rice farmers cannot increase production, as 
shown in the heterogeneous analysis of rice production (Reported in appendix 
table A-6). We also found consistent results in the heterogeneous analysis of 
agricultural inputs use that indicate small-holder farmers do not increase 
agricultural input use after the policy intervention (Reported in appendix table 
A-6).  In developing countries, small farms are generally poor. They have 
limited working capital to invest in agricultural inputs to increase production, 
although they are aware the return from such investments is high (Duflo et al., 
2011). When many Asian countries moved rapidly towards agricultural 
industrialization, small farms were regarded as a major obstacle to this process 
(Fan & Chan-kang, 2005). Therefore, the policy hurts household welfare at the 
aggregate level as the proportion of net sale households in the economy is well 
below the proportion of net buyer households. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of relaxing rice export licensing restrictions on 
household welfare. As the policy affects only the rice sector, this setting allows 
us to implement a different-in-differences setting to study the impacts of the 
rice export liberalization policy.  
The higher rice farm gate price associated with export liberalization policy is a 
good incentive for rice farmers to expand production through increasing use of 
labour and chemical fertilizer. According to our estimates, rice yield per acre 
increased by 71.7 percent on average after the policy change followed by higher 
use of hired labour and chemical fertilizers. The increase in production leads to 
increases in household consumption in rice-cultivating households. However, 
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the benefits from the policy mostly accrue to rich households because only 
larger-scale farmers can invest more in agricultural inputs.  
Although the policy creates employment for rural landless households, the gain 
from employment growth is not large enough to cover higher food prices 
associated with the export liberalization. Moreover, the higher rice prices harm 
rural landless households, urban households and non-export-crops cultivating 
households and the adverse effects are mostly concentrated on poor households. 
Findings indicate that after the policy intervention, per capita consumption 
expenditure per day decreases by 234.134 Kyats (approximately 0.18 US$) on 
average due to the higher rice prices. The evidence from the triple difference-in- 
differences setting and using information from all three household surveys 
confirms the validity of the baseline estimates.  
Our findings indicate that the rice export liberalization policy hurts household 
welfare at the aggregate level, which contradicts the findings of Minot and 
Goletti’s paper that studied the impacts of removing rice export quotas in 
Vietnam. Findings of this study fill the gap of Minot and Goletti by indicating that 
rice-cultivating-households, which are not in net sales position (even small net 
purchases) hurt because of higher rice prices, and small-holder farmers 
generally do not have capital to expand production. Findings in this study also 
provide the reassurance of the distributional results. For example, poor 
households lose more relative to non-poor households. The rural-landless 
households are vulnerable although the policy creates employment for them 
because the gain from employment growth is not large enough to cover higher 
food prices. In addition, results demonstrate the distributional effects on 
different types of household such as rural-landless households, urban 
households, rice-cultivating households, export-crops cultivating households 
and non-export-crops cultivating households.  
A policy application of this study is that an export liberalization policy needs to 
be integrated with wider agricultural development policies such as agricultural 
modernization and agricultural inputs subsidy programs so that farmers can 
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increase production to meet the higher demand resulting from the export 
liberalization policy. It is also important to be aware of the distributional effects 
of the policy on different types of households, particularly poor households in 
vulnerable situations, generally devoting more than 65 percent of their total 
expenditures to food. 
  
	
31 
 
References 
Abbott, P. C. (2011). Export restrictions as stabilization responses to food crisis. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(2), 428–434. 
Ahmed, R. U. (1988). Rice price stabilization and food security in Bangladesh. 
World Development, 16(9), 1035–1050. 
Amare, M., Denno Cisse, J., Jensen, N., & Shiferaw, B. (2014). The impact of 
agricultural productivity on welfare growth of farm households in Nigeria : 
A panel data analysis. In Food and Agricultural Organization. 
Anderson, J. E., & Van Wincoop, E. (2004). Trade costs. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 42(3), 691–751. 
Anderson, K., & Nelgen, S. (2012). Trade barrier volatility and agricultural 
price stabilization. World Development, 40(1), 36–48. 
Aragie, E., Pauw, K., & Pernechele, V. (2018). Achieving food security and 
industrial development in Malawi: Are export restrictions the solution? 
World Development, 108, 1–15. 
Balat, J., Brambilla, I., & Porto, G. (2009). Realizing the gains from trade: 
Export crops, marketing costs, and poverty. Journal of International 
Economics, 78(1), 21–31. 
Bleakley, H. (2007). Disease and development : Evidence from hookworm 
eradication in the American South. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
122(1), 73–117. 
Bryceson, D. F. (1999). African rural labour, income diversification & 
livelihood approaches : A long-term development perspective. Review of 
African Political Economy, 26(80), 171–189. 
Coello, B. (2009). Impact of exports liberalization and specialization in cash 
crop what are the expected gains for Vietnamese households. Economie 
Internationale, 118(2), 73–99. 
Coxhead, I. A., & Warr, P. G. (1991). Technical change, land quality, and 
income distribution: A general equilibrium analysis. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 73(2), 345. 
 
	
32 
 
De Franco, M., & Godoy, R. (1993). Potato-led growth: The macroeconomic 
effects of technological innovations in Bolivian agriculture. The Journal of 
Development Studies, 29(3), 561–587. 
Deaton, A. (1989). Rice prices and income distribution in Thailand: A 
non-parametric analysis. The Economic Journal, 99(395), 1. 
Deaton, A., & Zaidi, S. (2002). Guidelines for constructing consumption 
aggregates for welfare analysis (Vol. 135). 
Diao, X., Kennedy, A., Mabiso, A., & Pradesha, A. (2016). Economywide 
impact of maize export bans on agricultural growth and household welfare 
in Tanzania. Development Policy Review, 34(1), 101–134. 
Duflo, E., Kremer, M., & Robinson, J. (2011). Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: 
Theory and experimental evidence from Kenya. American Economic 
Review, 101(6), 2350–2390. 
Ellis, F. (1998). Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. The 
Journal of Development Studies, 35(1), 1–38. 
Fan, S., & Chan-kang, C. (2005). Is small beautiful ? Farm size , productivity , 
and poverty in Asian agriculture. Agricultural Economics, 32(s1), 135–
146. 
Hamermesh, D. S., & Trejo, S. J. (2000). The demand for hours of labour: 
Direct evidence from California. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
82(1), 38–47. 
Hertel, T. W., & Reimer, J. J. (2005). Predicting the poverty impacts of trade 
reform. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 14(4), 
377–405. 
Hoekman, B., Michalopoulos, C., Schiff, M., & Tarr, D. (2001). Trade policy 
reform and poverty alleviation. 
Hornbeck, R., & Keskin, P. (2015). Does agriculture generate local economic 
spillovers? Short-run and long-run evidence from the Ogallala aquifer. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2), 192–213. 
Irz, X., Lin, L., Thirtle, C., & Wiggins, S. (2001). Agricultural productivity 
growth and poverty alleviation. Development Policy Review, 19(4), 449–
466. 
	
33 
 
Ivanic, M., & Martin, W. (2008). Implications of higher global food prices for 
poverty in low-income countries. Agricultural Economics, 39(SUPPL. 1), 
405–416.  
Litchfield, J., Mcculloch, N., & Winters, L. A. (2003). Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization and Poverty Dynamics in Three Developing Countries. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(5), 1285–1291. 
Masanjala, W. H. (2006). Cash crop liberalization and poverty alleviation in 
Africa: Evidence from Malawi. Agricultural Economics, 35(2), 231–240. 
McCulloch, N., Winters, L. A., & Cirera, X. (2001). Trade libealizationa and 
poverty: A handbook. In Department of International Development, UK. 
Mellor, J. W. (1978). Food Price Policy and Income Distribution in 
Low-Income Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
27(1), 1–26. 
Minot, N., & Goletti, F. (1998). Export Liberalization and Household Welfare: 
The Case of Rice in Vietnam. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 80(4), 738–749. 
Morris, M., Kelly, V. A., Kopicki, R. J., & Byerlee, D. (2007). Fertilizer Use in 
African Agriculture. Lessons Learned and Good Practice Guidelines. In 
Experimental Agriculture (Vol. 44). 
Myanmar. Mininistry of Labour Immigration and Population. (2017). Thematic 
report on labour force (Vol. 4-G). 
Myers, R. J. (2006). On the costs of food price fluctuations in low-income 
countries. Food Policy, 31(4), 288–301. 
Nicita, A. (2009). The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact 
on household welfare. Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), 19–27. 
Porteous, O. (2017). Empirical effects of short-term export bans: The case of 
African maize. Food Policy, 71, 17–26. 
Swinnen, J. (2011). The right price of food. Development Policy Review, 29(6), 
667–688. 
The World Bank. (2017). An analysis of poverty in Myanmar. 
 
	
34 
 
Townsend, R. F., Kirsten, J., & Vink, N. (1998). Farm size , productivity and 
returns to scale in agriculture revisited : a case study of wine producers in 
South Africa. Agricultural Economics, 19, 175–180. 
Winters, L. A., McCulloch, N., & McKay, A. (2004). Trade liberalization and 
poverty: The evidence so far. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(1), 72–
115. 
Wodon, Q., & Zaman, H. (2009). Higher food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Poverty impact and policy responses. World Bank Research Observer, 
25(1), 157–176. 
  
	
35 
 
Appendix A 
Assessment for Cropping Pattern Changes 
We run OLS regression to assess the changes in rice-sown acres before and 
after policy intervention. We use the following equation to investigate whether 
farmers switch crops after the policy intervention: 
𝑌!!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋!!"! 𝛽! + 𝛿! + 𝜀!!", (A.1) 
where ℎ , 𝑗 , and 𝑡  indicate household, district, and year respectively. 
Outcomes variable is rice-sown acres of a household. “Post” is an indicator that 
takes one for the year 2015 and 0 takes otherwise. 𝑋!!" indicates household 
characteristics including household head’s education and sex, # of household 
members, # of children aged <=5, number of seniors aged 65+, and # of 
household members who were sick in the last three months. 
Table A- 1: Regression on Sown Acres  
 (1) 
 Rice sown acre 
Post (After relaxing restrictions) 0.709 
 (0.802) 
Household controls Yes 
Region controls Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes 
Observations 4,202 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 districts). 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A- 2: Impacts on Rice-cultivating Household Consumption 
 (1) 
 Log of household 
expenditure 
  
Post* Acre of rice plot a household own 0.004** 
(0.002) 
Plot controls No 
Household controls Yes 
Region controls Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes 
Observations 8324 
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level 
(62 districts). The unit of observations is households. The periods are 2010 and 2015. The 
dependent variable is the log of household consumption expenditure. “Household controls” 
include the natural log of acres owned, household head’s education and sex, # of household 
members, # of children aged <=5, # of seniors aged 65+, # of household members who were 
sick in the last three months, and dummy for agricultural inputs use. “Regional controls” include 
the log of the annual mean level rainfall, the mean level maximum temperature, and the average 
elevation. In all regressions, we control for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table A- 3: Classification of Household Types 
Household Types Descriptions 
Rural landless households • Households located in rural areas but do not own any type of 
agricultural land 
Urban households • Households located in urban area and do not own any type 
of agricultural land 
Rice-cultivating households • Households cultivate rice, at the same time they may 
cultivate other crops including one of the five export 
crops—that is, ground nut, sesame, green gram, black gram, 
and pigeon pea 
Export-crops cultivating 
households (Reference) 
• Households cultivate at least one of the five export 
crops—that is, ground nut, sesame, green gram, black gram, 
and pigeon pea, and do not cultivate rice at all 
Non-export-crops cultivating 
households 
• Households cultivate crops excluding rice, ground nut, 
sesame, green gram, black gram, and pigeon pea 
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Table A- 4: Effect on Different Types of Household (Absolute Value) 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total 
expenditure 
Food 
expenditure 
Non-food 
expenditure 
Post (After relaxing restrictions)  930.729*** 292.961** 119.346** 
 (148.036) (122.463) (49.012) 
Post * Treated HH (Rural landless HH) -647.984*** -563.760*** -81.380*** 
 (154.457) (147.900) (19.734) 
Post * Treated HH (Urban HH) -384.332** -212.233 -172.984*** 
 (174.549) (166.979) (40.977) 
Post * Treated HH (Rice-cultivating HH) 684.838*** 605.682*** 79.059*** 
(143.084) (141.081) (20.100) 
Post * Treated HH (Non-export-crops 
cultivating HH) 
-669.541** -480.041** -186.811** 
(260.464) (207.349) (72.697) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region controls Yes Yes Yes 
District-year two-way FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16771 16768 16771 
    
Notes: Coefficients with standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at district level (62 districts). 
The unit of observations is a household. The periods are 2010 and 2015. “Post” is an indicator, which equals 
zero for the year 2010, one for 2015. The dummy for treated households equals one for rural households, 
urban households, rice-cultivating households, non-export-crops cultivating households and zero for 
export-crops cultivating households.  
“Household controls” include: the natural log of total acres of land a household owned, household head’s 
education and sex, # of household members, # of children aged <=5, number of seniors aged 65+, and # of 
household members who were sick in the last three months. “Regional controls” include the log of the annual 
mean level rainfall, mean level maximum temperature, and the average elevation. In all regression, we 
control for district-year two-way fixed effects. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table A- 5: Calculation on Aggregate Welfare Impact 
N
o 
 HH Types 
Coeffic
ient 
HH Composition in 
Economy (%) 
Aggregate 
Welfare Impact 
1 Rural landless HH -647.98
4 
28 
-18143.552 
2 Urban HH -384.33
2 
25 
-9608.300 
3 Rice-cultivating HH 684.838 21 14381.598 
4 Non-export-crops 
cultivating HH 
-669.54
1 
15 
-10043.115 
5 Export-crops 
cultivating HH  
0 11 0 
    100 -23413.369 
  Per capita consumption expenditure per day -234.134 
 Per capita consumption expenditure per day (USD) -0.180 
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Table A- 6: Heterogeneous Analysis of Rice Output and Input 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  
 Production  Chemical Fertilizer  
 Acre<=3 3<Acres<=12 Acre>12  Acre<=3 3<Acres<=12 Acre>12  
DD estimate 0.338 0.392*** 1.830**  -0.019 0.217*** 0.184*  
 (0.310) (0.171) (0.685)  (0.079) (0.072) (0.102)  
Plot controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Household controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Region controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
District-year 
two-way FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 6102 4231 556  1698 2991 1159  
Note: We use restricted samples, in column (1), which has less than 3 acre (Small-scale farms defined by 
Myanmar agriculture census in 2010), in column (2) which has less than 12 acres (Small and medium 
farms defined by FAO) and in column (3), which has larger than 12 acres. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGE INTRODUCTION ON 
EMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM MANUFACTURING 
ENTERPRISES IN MYANMAR 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the large number of empirical studies on the subject in the literature, the 
effect of minimum wages is still controversial, particularly questions about 
whether minimum wages reduce employment. Proponents of the minimum 
wage insist that the policy has no adverse impacts on employment (Card & 
Krueger, 1995; Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2010; Stewart, 2004), but opponents 
suggest that minimum wages reduce employment because of the higher burden 
of labour costs associated with the minimum wage (Alatas & Cameron, 2013; 
Gindling & Terrell, 2007; Lordan & Neumark, 2018; Neumark & Wascher, 
2008). 
Many studies in existing literature have explored the impacts of the policy, but 
most of the studies focus on evidence from developed countries. The nature and 
structure of labour markets in developed countries may be very different from 
developing countries, so findings in existing literature cannot provide the 
evidence for a well-defined conclusion as to who bears the burden of higher 
wages in developing countries (Harrison & Leamer, 1997; Lemos, 2009). We 
have some evidence from developing countries but it may not be possible to 
generalize results to other countries. In addition, the impacts of first ever 
introduction of minimum wages may differ from the incremental increases. In 
order to fill the gap in existing literature with evidence from a developing 
country, this study investigates the impacts of minimum wage introduction in 
Myanmar on employment, investment, productivity, and profit through the use 
of enterprise level panel data. 
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Implementation timing and the initial wage rate enable this research to use a 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach to explore the causal impacts of the 
introduction of the minimum wage. Wage distribution data pre-policy 
intervention is used to classify treatment enterprises, which are affected by the 
policy and control enterprises which are not.  
Firstly, this paper studies compliance of the enterprises with the implementation 
of the minimum wage by exploring the impacts on labour cost per employee. 
The results suggest that the labour cost of policy-affected enterprises increased 
by 72.2% after enforcement. Second, this paper investigates how the enterprises 
reacted to the policy, for example, by: reducing employment to bear the burden 
of higher labour cost; increasing investment in capital; or raising productivity. 
Finally, this research discusses the effects of the introduction of the minimum 
wage on small-enterprises, which are legally exempt from enforcement. 
We find significant evidence of job losses in post-policy implementation, which 
contradicts previous papers in literature that studied the effects of minimum 
wage introduction in Korea and the United Kingdom (Baek & Park, 2016; 
Stewart, 2004) but support the findings from the study of the introduction of the 
minimum wage in Germany (Caliendo, Schröder, & Wittbrodt, 2018). 
Policy-affected enterprises increase investment in machinery and equipment as 
a substitute for labour. We then investigate whether enterprises increase labour 
productivity to share a burden of higher labour costs. We use the Gross Value 
Added (GVA) per employee [(Profits+Remuneration)/Labour] to study the 
policy impact on labour productivity (Riley & Rosazza Bondibene, 2017). 
Results suggest that the productivity increases in policy-affected enterprises 
after the minimum wage introduction. 
The effect of the minimum wage may differ due to the initial minimum wage 
rate and situation of the labour market. If the original wage rate is lower than 
the marginal labour product, then the increase in wages can provide benefits to 
employees and, at the same time, enterprises can still profit even at the higher 
wage rate (Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995). Finally, this article explores the impacts of 
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the policy on enterprise profits. Findings indicate that there is no significant 
adverse impact on enterprise profit, which contradicts evidence from developed 
countries (Draca, Machin, & Reenen, 2011). Findings also suggest that despite 
samll-enterprises being legally exempt from enforcement, they also have to take 
the burden of higher labour cost.   
The organisation of the study proceeds as follows. The institutional context of 
the national minimum wage introduction in Myanmar and the enterprise surveys 
used in this study are discussed in section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the 
identification approach used to explore the causal effects of the introduction of 
minimum wage, and then discuss the results in chapter 2.4. Section 2.5 
describes the  effects on small-enterprises followed by section 2.6, conclusion.  
2.2 Institutional Context and Data 
2.2.1 Institutional Context 
In Myanmar, parliament enacted the first-ever national minimum wage law in 
March, 2013. The main purpose of law is to raise wages to meet the basic needs 
of employees and their families. In addition, it is aimed to increase the capacity 
of workers and to encourage competitiveness in terms of development of skills. 
In accordance with the law, the National Committee for Minimum Wage 
proposed a wage rate at Kyat 3,600 per day for 8 hours working time per day, 
taking account of the average living cost of a person in the country and the 
wage of government staff at the lowest rank.   
On 29 June 2015, the government of Myanmar announced a minimum wage of 
3,600 kyats (about 2.6 US$) per day following a year of consultations between 
unions, government and employers. The International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) and employers criticised the proposed rate. Local unions 
called for higher pay at 4,000 kyats per day while employers said that even the 
proposed minimum wage was unsustainable for business and they could not 
afford more than 2,500 kyats per day. 
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Enforcement began on 1st September 2015, for all employees in the country 
except those in small and family-run businesses with a workforce of 15 workers 
or less. For noncompliance, the law stipulates a penalty for employers up to 
300,000 Kyats (US$ 337 equivalent) and up to 6 months in prison.  
2.2.2 Data  
This study uses the Myanmar Enterprise Survey (ES) panel dataset conducted in 
2014 and 2016 by the World Bank. The survey is an enterprise-level survey that 
collects information from the sample of non-agriculture, formal private sector 
enterprises. Information about enterprise characteristics includes: annual sales 
volume, annual costs of raw materials and labour and capacity utilization. Data 
was collected from 556 enterprises in both rounds.  
The Enterprise Survey includes information from both manufacturing and 
service sectors but excludes all public and utility sectors, and enterprises with 
100% government ownership. The sample was weighted by the population size; 
collecting more sample enterprises in regions with a larger population. The 
survey used the stratified random sampling at three stages: industry type, 
enterprise size, and region. The industry stratification includes: manufacturing, 
retail, and other services industries. The enterprises are divided into three 
groups: small enterprises (5-19 workers), medium-sized enterprises (20-99 
workers) and large enterprises (100 workers or more). The regional 
stratification includes: Yangon, Mandalay, Bago, Taunggyi and Monywa. The 
survey is not nationally representative as data is collected from the enterprises 
located in five regions out of 15 in Myanmar.   
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Table 2-1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Average monthly labour cost per 
employee (Kyats) 
128656.5 134981.6 2702.703 1500000 
Number of employees per enterprise 241.349 379.540 16 2000 
Annual investment on machinery and 
equipment (Kyats in million) 
5350 50000 0 480000 
Enterprise annual profits (Kyats in 
million) 
1990 18000 -81000 240000 
Dummy for small enterprises (Yes=1) 0.231 0.423 0 1 
Dummy for medium enterprises (Yes=1) 0.360 0.481 0 1 
Dummy for large enterprises (Yes=1) 0.398 0.491 0 1 
Dummy for enterprises located in large 
cities (Yes=1) 
0.812 0.392 0 1 
# of years since enterprise established 17.308 12.057 0 75 
Dummy for export enterprises (Yes=1) 0.720 0.450 0 1 
Dummy for access to credit (Yes=1) 0.787 0.411 0 1 
# of operating hours per week 58.826 23.032 24 168 
Dummy for having internationally 
recognized certificate (Yes=1) 
0.902 0.297 0 1 
Annual sales volume (Kyats in million) 7150 73600 17.50 960000 
Annual cost on electricity (Kyats in million) 28.30 49.70 0 350 
Annual cost on raw materials (Kyats in 
million) 
588 1700 0 12000 
Observations  186   
     
Notes: 1 US$ approximately equals to 1,350 Kyats (Local currency) in 2015. 
Enterprises with 15 employees or less in 2014 are excluded from the baseline 
study because they are exempt from enforcement. In addition, this paper uses 
information from only manufacturing enterprises observed in both surveys to 
control endogenous exit and entry of enterprises and to follow up the variation 
in the number of employees. The summary statistics of the main variables used 
in this research are described in Table 2.1.  
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2.3 Identification Strategy 
2.3.1 Defining Treatment and Comparison Enterprises 
The strategy used in this study to analyze the effects of the minimum wage 
introduction is to compare the outcome variables in policy-affected enterprises 
relative to their counterparts. This paper exploits the fact that the enterprises in 
which the average monthly labour cost per employee in 2014 is less than the 
minimum wage rate to define a policy-affected enterprise. The position of wage 
distribution allows this study to design a DID framework. The treatment 
indicator is denoted as T=1 for the enterprises in which average monthly labour 
cost per employee in 2014 (AW2014) is less than the 2015 minimum wage (MW) 
rate and T=0 for enterprises in which the average labour cost is higher than the 
2015 minimum wage rate (AW2014>MW).   
The enterprise average monthly labour cost per employee is a good proxy to 
identify enterprises, whether they are mostly affected or not by the minimum 
wage because the ratio of low wage employees tapers off rapidly after the 
policy introduction (Baek & Park, 2016; Draca et al., 2011). 
Enterprises with 15 employees or less in 2014 are excluded from the baseline 
study because they are exempt from enforcement. To eliminate the potential 
endogeneity due to the exit and entry of enterprises, this paper uses information 
from enterprises observed in both surveys. Bootstrap-based cluster standard 
errors are used to study the impacts of the minimum wage introduction, and it 
can be expressed by equation (2.1): 
Y!" =  β! +  β!Post + β!Treat + β!Post ∗ Treat + X!"! β!+θ!+ ∈!,     (2.1) 
Where, ‘i’ indicates enterprises and ‘t’ indexes time periods, which are 2014 
and 2016. In this setting, information from enterprises, which have more than 
15 employees and observed in both surveys are used. “Post” is a dummy 
variable in which ‘1’ indicates for the year 2016 and 0 otherwise. “Treat” is 
defined as follows; (i) the dummy variable in which ‘1’ indicates the enterprise 
in which average monthly labour cost per employee at 2014 is less than the 
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minimum wage rate, ‘0’ otherwise, (ii) a continuous treatment variable 
indicating the absolute difference between the average monthly labour cost per 
employee in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage rate where the labour cost is 
lower than the minimum wage as shown in equation (2.2); otherwise, ‘Treat’ 
takes zero.  
The outcomes of interest, denoted as 𝐘𝐢𝐭  are the natural log of enterprise 
monthly average labor cost per worker, the log of the number of employees, the 
natural log of investment on machinery and equipment, the log of Gross Value 
Added (GVA) per employee, and the natural log of enterprise profit. The 
equation also includes the region-year two-way fixed effects "𝛉𝐣".  “𝐗𝐢𝐭! ”  
denotes the enterprise-level characterstics including the dummies for the 
different size of enterprises, which includes three groups: small-enterprise 
(employee<20), medium-enterprise (20<=employee<100) and large-enterprise 
(employee>100), the size of the population of the city where the enterprise 
located, the dummy for export enterprises, the dummy for access to credit, the 
log of the annual sale, the log of the number of operating hours per week, 
number of years since enterprise established, the log of the annual cost on the 
raw materials, and the log of the annual cost of electricity.  
2.3.2 Defining Continuous Measure of Treatment  
The policy-affected enterprises are obliged to pay the minimum wage rate at 
least, therefore, the impacts on the enterprises in which pre-policy average 
labour cost is far below the minimum wage rate may be very different from 
enterprises in which the average labour cost is just below the 2015 national 
minimum wage rate. In order to allow differential effects among enterprises in 
the treatment group, this paper uses continuous treatment, which is the absolute 
gap between the pre-policy wage and the 2015 minimum wage rate and defined 
as follows:  
Treatment Intensity! =  
 
 
ln   AWage!,!"#$ −MWage   
 
if AWage!,!"#$ < MWage   
(2.2) 0 if AWage!,!"#$ > MWage   
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Where AWage!,!"#$ is the pre-policy average labour cost of the enterprise “i” 
and MWage is the 2015 minimum wage rate.	The treatment intensity equals 
zero for the enterprises in the control group. The coefficients of the interaction 
term “Post and Treat” in equation (2.1) will capture the impacts of the minimum 
wage introduction.  
This paper uses an additional continuous treatment, i.e. a negative log of the 
pre-policy average wage for all enterprises to study the effects of the policy by 
using equation (2.3) (Baek & Park, 2016; Draca et al., 2011):  
Y!" =  β0 +  β1Post + β2(−1 ∗ ln_PrepolicyWage) + β3Post ∗ −1 ∗ lnPrepolicyWage +
X!"! β!+θ!+ ∈!,     (2.3) 
Where, “Treat”  is defined as a continuous treatment variable indicating the 
negative log of the pre-policy wage (The negative log is used to indicate the 
coefficients that are consistently defined with the results from the low-wage 
dummy) for all enterprieses in the sample. The outcomes of interest, denoted 
𝐘𝐢𝐭 are the natural log of enterprise monthly average labour cost per worker, the 
log of the number of employees, the log of investment in machinery and 
equipment, the log of Gross Value Added (GVA) per employee, and the natural 
log of enterprise profit. Estimates from equation (2.3) are presented in Panel C 
of Table 2.2.  
2.4 Results 
This section discusses empirical findings of the minimum wage effects on the  
enterprise average monthly labour cost per employee, employment, investment 
on machinery and equipment, productivity, and profit.  
2.4.1 Main Results  
Estimates from equation (2.1) are reported in panel A of Table 2.2. Columns 
(1)–(5) provide estimates of the natural log of the enterprise-level monthly 
average labour cost per employee, the log of number of employees, the log of 
investment in machinery and equipment, the log of GVA per employee, and the 
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log of enterprise’s profit respectively. All specifications include region-year 
two-ways fixed effects and enterprise-level characteristics including dummies 
of different sizes of enterprise, the population of the cities where the enterprise 
located, # of years since enterprise established, dummy for export enterprises, 
dummy for access to credit, the log of the number of operating hours per week, 
the log of the annual sales, the log of the annual raw material cost, and the log 
of the annual electricity cost.  
The coefficients of the interaction term “Post and Treat” in Table 2.2 describe 
the estimates from a difference-in-differences approach. “Treat” in Panel A is 
discrete category which indicates policy-affected enterprises, in Panel B 
represents a continuous treatment which indicates the absolute difference 
between the average monthly labour cost per employee in 2014 and the 2015 
minimum wage rate if the labour cost per employee in 2014 is lower than the 
2015 minimum wage; otherwise, Treatment takes zero, in Panel C indicates the 
negative log of pre-policy labour cost for all enterprises in the sample. 
Coefficients in Column (1) of Panel A indicate that the average-monthly labour 
cost per employee in policy-affected enterprises increased by 72.2% relative to 
their counterparts after the policy intervention, in Panel B indicates 0.085 
percentage points increase if the gap between the pre-policy wages and the 
minimum wage in an enterprise is one percent higher, and in Panel C mentions 
one percent lower in pre-policy wage is associated with 0.912 percentage point 
increase in average labour cost.  As the magnitude of the coefficients is large, 
the absolute value of average labour cost is used to assess the economic 
sensibility of the findings. The average labour cost in policy-affected enterprises 
increased by 50853 Kyats (approximately 37.5 US$) per month, and the one 
percent higher gap between pre-policy wage and the minimum wage rate is 
associated with a 5445 Kyats (approximately 4 US$) increase in average labour 
cost. (Reported in appendix table B-1). Another possible explanation why the 
magnitude of the estimates are large is that some enterprises paid much lower 
wage rates e.g., 10 US$ per month in pre-policy interventation, however, after 
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the policy implemenation they have to pay the minimum wage rate, which is 
about 86 US$ per month.  
Estimates in Column (2) indicate the effects on employment and Panel A 
reveals that policy-affected enterprises reduce employment by 41.9%, Panel B 
indicates 0.044 percentage points decrease if one percent higher in the absolute 
gap between the labour cost in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage, and in Panel 
C presents one percent lower in pre-policy wage is associated with 0.282 
percentage point decrease in employment.  This paper uses the information of 
both full-time and part-time employees in this setting. As the policy may have 
differential impact on different types of job tenure, the restricted samples such 
as only full-time employees is used to explore the differential effects of the 
policy. Results are consistent with the baseline estimates (Reported in columm 
2 of appendix table B-1) Therefore, the findings in this paper suggest that 
enterprises reduce employment to bear the higher burden of labour cost, which 
contradicts empirical studies indicating limited impacts on employment (Baek 
& Park, 2016; Draca et al., 2011; Hirsch, Kaufman, & Zelenska, 2013; Stewart, 
2004), but supports empirical findings of the minimum wage introduction in 
Germany in 2015 (Caliendo et al., 2018).   
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Table 2-2: Impacts of Minimum Wage Introduction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log of 
labour 
cost per 
employee 
Log of # 
of employee 
Log of 
investment 
Log of 
GVA per 
employee 
Log of 
profit 
Panel A: Treat= Low-wage enterprise dummy    
Post x Treat 0.722*** -0.419** 1.605** 0.146** -0.150 
 (0.154) (0.201) (0.729) (0.068) (0.263) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 84 139 142 
Panel B: Treat= ln(AW2014 – MW) for low wage 
enterprise 
   
Post x Treat 0.085*** -0.044** 0.160** 0.014* -0.009 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.074) (0.007) (0.019) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 76 139 142 
Panel C: Treat= - ln(Pre-policy average wage)    
Post x Treat 0.912*** -0.282* 2.730* 0.082* -0.040 
 (0.086) (0.168) (1.491) (0.045) (0.092) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 76 140 142 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with bootstrap-based cluster standard error in parentheses. All 
regressions use information from enterprises, which have more than 15 employees and observed in 
both surveys. “Post*Treatment” is the interaction between Post and Treat, where Post is an indicator 
for the year 2016 and “Treat” in Panel A equals one if the monthly average labour cost per worker of 
enterprise “i” in 2014 is lower than the 2015 minimum wage rate; otherwise, Treat takes zero, in 
Panel B, “Treat” takes the log of absolute difference between the monthly average labour cost per 
worker in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage if the labour cost in 2014 is less than the 2015 
minimum wage; otherwise, Treat takes zero, in Panel C, “Treat” is defined as the negative log of 
pre-policy labour cost for all enterprises in the sample. 
“Enterprise controls” includes dummies for the different size of enterprises, dummy for the size of 
the population of the city where enterprise is located, # of years since enterprise established, dummy 
for export enterprises, dummy for access to credit, # of operation hours per week, the log of the 
annual sale, the log of the annual raw material cost, and the log of the annual electricity cost. In all 
regression, this study controls for the district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
This paper finds consistent results which show enterprises increase their 
investment in machinery and equipment to replace the higher cost workers after 
the minimum wage introduction (Neumark & Wascher, 2008). The coefficient 
of the interaction term “Post and Treatment” in Column (3) of Panel A reveals 
that investment in machinery and equipment increases by 160.50 percent 
relative to comparison enterprises after the policy implementation, Panel B 
indicates a 0.16 percentage points increase if there is a one percent higher 
absolute gap between the labour cost in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage, and 
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Panel C represents a one percent lower pre-policy wage associated with a 2.73 
percentage point increase in investment in machinery and equipment. 
The estimates in column (4) of Panel A describe the impacts on labour 
productivity, which is the gross value added (GVA) per employee 
[(Profits+Remuneration)/Labour]. Findings indicate that labour productivity in 
policy-affected enterprises increase by 14.6 percent relative to the enterprises 
which are not affected by the policy after the minimum wage introduction. 
Estimates in Panel B indicate that one more percent higher gap between the 
pre-policy wage and the minimum wage is assocaited with 0.014 percentage 
point increase in labour productivity and in Panel C, one percent lower 
pre-policy wage is associated with 0.082 percentage point increase in labour 
productivity.  
The coefficients of the interaction terms in Column (5) of each of Panel A, 
Panel B, and Panel C show that there is no discernible effect on enterprise 
profit. One of the possible explanations is that enterprises may pass on the 
burden of higher labour cost on their product prices to maintain the same profit 
level, but this study cannot show empirical evidence because of data limitations.  
2.4.2 Robustness Checks 
A set of robustness checks is conducted to support the validity of the baseline 
estimates. Samples are trimmed into different groups based on average labour 
cost to discover the sensitivity of the effects of the minimum wage introduction. 
Firstly, the excluded samples from the study are enterprises in which average 
labour costs in 2014 are just 20% below or above the minimum wage rate. 
Estimates are reported in Panel A of Table 2.3. Secondly, samples in first and 
last quintiles of average labour cost are excluded because the effects on 
enterprises in which pre-policy labour cost is very far from the minimum wage 
rate might be very different from the enterprises in which average labour cost is 
well above the minimum wage. Estimates are presented in Panel B of Table 
2.3. 
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“Treat” in Panel A and Panel B are a discrete variable indicating low wage 
enterprises. The size of coefficients in all specifications are quite different from 
the baseline estimates; however, estimates support the robustness of the baseline 
results. 
Table 2-3: Robustness check  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
 
Log of labour  
cost per 
employee 
Log of # 
of  
employee 
Log of 
investment  
Log of 
GVA per 
employee  
Log of 
profit 
Panel A: Treat= Low-wage enterprise dummy 
(Subsamples: Exclude enterprises in which AW2014 is just below or above MW) 
Post x Treat 1.217*** -0.823*** 1.751** 0.154* -0.273 
(0.242) (0.264) (0.876) (0.081) (0.357) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way 
FE  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 99 99 68 101 99 
 
Panel B: Treat= Low-wage enterprise dummy 
(Subsamples: Exclude enterprises in first and last quintiles) 
Post x Treat 0.478*** -0.467** 0.258*** 0.128** 0.031 
 (0.090) (0.227) (0.019) (0.63) (0.064) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way 
FE  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 94 94 46 94 94 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with bootstrap-based cluster standard error in parentheses. All regressions 
use the information from enterprises which have more than 15 employees and are observed in both 
surveys. “Post*Treat” is the interaction between Post and Treat, where “Post” is an indicator for the year 
2016. “Treat” in Panel A and B takes one if the monthly average labour cost per worker of enterprise “i” in 
2014 is less than the 2015 minimum wage; otherwise, “Treat” takes zero. In Panel A, enterprises in which 
average labour cost in 2014 is just below or above the minimum wage rate in 2015 are excluded, in Panel 
B, enterprises in first and last quintiles of the average labour cost are excluded from the study. 
“Enterprise controls” include dummy for the different size of enterprises, dummy for the size of the 
population of the city where enterprise located, # of years since enterprise established, dummy for export 
enterprises, dummy for access to credit, # of the operation hours per week, the log of the annual sale, the 
log of the annual raw material cost, and the log of the annual electricity cost. In all regression, this paper 
controls for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As this study uses a Difference-in-Differences approach, the validity of baseline 
estimates mainly depends on the parallel trend assumption in pre-policy 
intervention. In the absence of the policy intervention, the trends in outcome 
variables in treatment group and control group would go parallel over time. The 
data do not support conduct of a falsification test by implementing a pseudo 
policy in pre-policy intervention to prove the parallel trend assumption in 
outcome variables, as there is only one survey in pre-policy intervention. An 
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additional robustness check, therefore, by using the Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) method, which does not rely on the parallel trend assumption is 
conducted.  
The purpose is to study the impact of minimum wage introduction on wage, 
employment, investment, productivity, and profit by comparing policy-affected 
enterprises (denote T=1) in which the pre-policy wage is lower than the 2015 
minimum wage rate relative to enterprises in which the pre-policy wage is 
higher than the minimum wage rate (denote T=0). Then, the outcomes for 
policy-affected enterprises are defined Y1 and the outcome for enterprises not 
affected by the policy that uses (T=0) as Y0. If the mean value of outcomes 
between the policy-affected enterprises and their counterparts are compared, the 
results would probably be biased due to the sample selection problem. To 
eliminate the sample selection problem, this paper makes the assumption the 
selection is only made by using the observable characterisitcs of enterprises, and 
all observable variables influence enterprise wage distribution and enterprise 
performance are simultaneously observed. This study matches the 
policy-affected enterprises and their conterparts on their propensity scores, 
which are the probabilities that indicate the pre-policy wage is lower than the 
2015 minimum wage rate conditional on covariates. Under these assumptions, 
this study uses equation (2.4), to estimate the average treatment effects on the 
treated (ATE) as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 𝑌!! 𝑇 = 1,𝑃(𝑋!) −  𝐸[𝑌!!|𝑇 = 0,𝑃(𝑋!)],  (2.4) 
where 𝑌!! 𝑇 = 1,𝑃(𝑋!)  stands for the outcomes in the ith enterprise which is 
affected by the policy, under conditions Xi. The term 𝑌!! 𝑇 = 0,𝑃(𝑋!)  stands 
for the outcomes in the ith enterprise which is not affected by the policy under 
the same conditions Xi. The estimates described in Table 2.4 are quite different 
from the baseline estimates, but all are still significant and consistent with the 
baseline estimates.  
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Table 2-4: Robustness Check (Propensity Score Matching) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  Log of 
labour cost 
per 
employee 
Log of # 
of 
employee 
Log of 
investment  
Log of 
GVA per 
employee 
Log of 
profit 
ATE 0.369*** -0.263* 1.922* 0.062* -0.039 
(0.093) (0.138) (1.157) (0.035) (0.102) 
Number of treated 
enterprises 
48 48 25 48 48 
Number of control 
enterprises 
25 25 17 25 25 
Notes: Coefficients estimated with Nearest-neighbour Matching method are reported with standard error in 
parentheses. All specifications use information from enterprises, which have more than 15 employees.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
2.5 Effects on Exempted Enterprises 
Countries like Korea and Myanmar initially excluded small enterprises from 
enforcement of the minimum wage introduction as a protection policy. Small 
enterprises in many countries continue to demand exemption from enforcement 
of the incremental increases or introduction of minimum wages. Although it is 
widely debated in many countries, there is limited empirical research on 
whether the exemption policy can protect small enterprises. 
This paper exploits the policy variation based on the enterprise size to discover 
the effects of the minimum wage introduction on legally exempt enterprises. 
Enterprises, which have 15 employees or less are legally exempt from 
enforcement but they may have to raise wages to maintain employee 
satisfaction and motivation. Generally, both small-enterprises and other 
enterprises are located in the same industrial zones and job turnover rate in 
Myanmar is high. If this is the case, then minimum wage implementation may 
affect on small-enterprises although they are legally exempt from enforcement.  
To explore the minimum wage impacts on small-enterprises, information from 
enterprises, which have 15 employees or less are used. Table 2.5 describes 
estimates from equation (2.1). “Treat” in Panel A is a binary variable indicating 
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low wage enterprises, in which the pre-policy wage is less than the 2015 
minimum wage rate, in Panel B it takes the log of the absolute difference 
between the labour cost in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage for the low wage 
enterprises, otherwise “Treat” is zero, in Panel C it indicates the negative log of 
pre-policy wages.  
Table 2-5: Impacts on Exempted Enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Log of labour 
cost per employee 
Log of # of 
 employee 
Log of 
investment  
Log of 
GVA per 
employee  
Log of 
profit 
Panel A: Treat= Low-wage enterprise dummy    
Post x Treat 0.684*** -0.220 -1.360 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.143) (0.164) (2.048) (0.016) (0.002) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 128 129 49 126 129 
      
Panel B: Treat= ln (AW2014 – MW) for low wage enterprise   
Post x Treat 0.073*** -0.023 -0.113 0.0009 -0.001 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.226) (0.001) (0.004) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 128 129 49 126 129 
      
Panel C: Treat= - ln(Pre-policy average wage)    
Post x Treat 0.812*** -0.148 -0.798 0.025	 0.002 
 (0.093) (0.146) (2.820) (0.015)	 (0.001) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 126 125 47 127	 126 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with bootstrap-based cluster standard error in parentheses. All regressions 
use the information from enterprises, which have 15 employees or less and are observed in both surveys. 
“Post*Treat” is the interaction between Post and Treat where “Post” is an indicator for the year 2016 and 
“Treat” in Panel A, equals one if the monthly average labour cost per worker of enterprise “i” in 2014 is 
lower than the 2015 minimum wage; otherwise, “Treat” takes zero, in Panel B takes the log of the absolute 
difference between the 2014 labour cost and the 2015 minimum wage if the labour cost in 2014 is less than 
the minimum wage; otherwise, “Treat” takes zero. “Treat” in Panel C indicates the negative of log of 
pre-policy average labour cost per employee for all enterprises in the sample.  
“Enterprise controls” include dummies for the different size of enterprises, dummy for the size of the 
population of the city where enterprise is located, # of years since enterprise established, dummy for export 
enterprises, dummy for access to credit, # of operation hours per week, the log of the annual sales, the log 
of the annual raw material cost, and the log of the annual electricity cost. In all regression, the study 
controls for district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The coefficient in Column (1) of Panel A indicates that the average labour cost 
in exempt enterprises increased by 68.4 percent after the minimum wage 
introduction, in Panel B shows that a one percent higher gap between the 
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pre-policy wage and the minimum wage is associated with 0.073 percentage 
points increase in labour cost, and in Panel C denotes that one percent lower 
pre-policy wage is associated with 0.812 percentage points increase in labour 
cost. However, there is no statistically significant impact on employment, 
investment, productivity and profit of enterprises. Findings suggest that 
although small enterprises are legally exempt from enforcement, they also have 
to raise labour cost.  
A possible explanation why this study does not find discernible effects on 
employment and profit in small enterprises is that the employees in small 
enterprises may get fewer hours of work although they are earning more per 
hour, or they may pass on the burden of higher wages on the price of their 
products. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Most of the studies in the existing literature focus on evidence from developed 
countries and explore economic impacts of incremental increases in existing 
minimum wages. In contrast, this study explores the effects of the minimum 
wage introduction in Myanmar by using enterprise level data. The timing of 
minimum wage introduction and the initial minimum wage rate enable us to 
adopt a Difference-in-Differences approach to study the policy impacts.  
Results indicate that the policy-affected enterprises increase the average 
monthly labour cost per employee by 72.2%. To bear the burden of higher wage 
rate, enterprises reduce employment by 41.9%. The investment in machinery 
and equipment in the policy-affected enterprises increases by 160.5% to 
substitute the higher cost labour and also raise labour productivity. Although the 
small enterprises, with 15 employees or less, are legally exempt from 
enforcement, they also have to bear the burden of higher labour cost resulting 
from the national minimum wage introduction. 
To briefly summarize the findings of this paper: the minimum wage 
introduction in Myanmar has inevitable adverse consequences for employment, 
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so government may need comprehensive empirical evidence on the minimum 
wage introduction to inform its first increase but government already increased 
minimum wages from 3600 Kyats to 4800 Kyats in 2018 without the benefit of 
any empirical evidence on the consequences of its introduction of the minimum 
wage. To mitigate the adverse effects on employment, government should 
implement policies to support enterprises e.g., grants or fiscal incentives. 
Although this study finds reliable results, it still has limitations. First, the results 
can only reveal the short-term effects of the minimum wage introduction 
because the survey in the post-policy intervention was conducted just after one 
and a half years of enforcement. Second, with only one survey in the pre-policy 
intervention this study cannot conduct a pseudo experiment to support the 
validity of the identification assumption of the baseline estimation. Finally, as 
this paper studies only the enterprises observed in both surveys, to eliminate 
potential heterogeneity due to the enterprises’ entry and exit, it has a limited 
number of observations.  
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Appendix B 
Table B- 1: Impacts of Minimum Wage Introduction 
 
(1) (2) 
Labour cost per employee Log of # of  
full-time employee  
Panel A: Treat= Low-wage enterprise dummy  
Post x Treat 50853.345** -0.494** 
 (19846.273) (0.225) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 
   
Panel B: Treat= ln(AW2014 – MW) for low wage enterprise  
Post x Treat 5445.846*** -0.050** 
 (1956.345) (0.023) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 
   
Panel A: Treat= - ln(Pre-policy average wage)  
Post x Treat 29464.978** -0.305* 
 (14871.698) (0.173) 
Enterprise controls Yes Yes 
Region-year two-way FE  Yes Yes 
Observations 142 142 
   
Notes: Coefficients are reported with bootstrap-based cluster standard error in parentheses. All 
regressions use information from enterprises, which have more than 15 employees and are 
observed in both surveys. “Post*Treatment” is the interaction between Post and Treat, where 
Post is an indicator for the year 2016 and “Treat” in Panel A equals one if the monthly average 
labour cost per worker of enterprise “i” in 2014 is lower than the 2015 minimum wage rate; 
otherwise, Treat takes zero, in Panel B, “Treat” takes the log of absolute difference between the 
monthly average labour cost per worker in 2014 and the 2015 minimum wage if the labour cost 
in 2014 is less than the 2015 minimum wage; otherwise, Treat takes zero, Panel C is the 
negative log of pre-policy labour cost of all enterprises in the sample.  
“Enterprise controls” include dummies for the different size of enterprises, dummy for the size 
of the population of the city where enterprise is located, # of years since enterprise established, 
dummy for export enterprises, dummy for access to credit, # of operation hours per week, the 
log of the annual sale, the log of the annual raw material cost, and the log of the annual 
electricity cost. In all regression, this study controls for the district-year two-way fixed effects.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
SUBSTANCE ADDICTION AND POVERTY: EVIDENCE FROM 
CHEWING BETEL-QUID IN MYANMAR 
 
3.1  Introduction 
To a majority of the poor, substance addiction and poverty go hand in hand. 
The relationship between substance addiction and poverty has strong reverse 
causality. Poverty develops different values of life for the poor, reduces rational 
control and keeps them in a vulnerable condition (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; 
Carvalho, Meier, & Wang, 2016; Spears, 2011). The poor may be aware of the 
adverse consequences of substance addiction but they may maximize utility at 
the moment of consumption to satisfy a pleasure appetite. Therefore, using an 
addictive substance, like smoking tobacco, is more prevalent amongst the poor 
than the rich (Bobak, Jha, Nguyen, & Jarvis, 2000). 
On the other hand, empirical findings suggest that drugs, like marijuana and 
cocaine, can increase the probability of being poor (Kaestner, 1998). Empirical 
evidence in substance addiction literature indicates the economic burden of 
alcohol consumption (Thavorncharoensap et al., 2009) and tobacco 
consumption (Ekpu & Brown, 2015; Wendy, 2001). Addiction to a substance 
like smoking tobacco, can have negative effects on household welfare in 
several ways, such as loss of productivity and missed working days due to 
smoking-related diseases and deaths (Jones & Efroymson, 2011), and 
smoking-attributable medical spending (Cowan & Schwab, 2011; Liu et al., 
2006; Xin et al., 2009). The direct economic costs of smoking is also a major 
financial burden for low-income families (John, 2008; John, Ross, & Blecher, 
2012; John et al., 2011)  
This paper examines the impacts of chewing betel-quid on household welfare. 
Betel nut has been regarded as the world's fourth most widely consumed 
addictive substance after alcohol, nicotine and caffeine and it is estimated that 
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about 600 million people chew betel regularly (Wu et al., 2015). The betel-quid 
is widely consumed in central, south, south-east Asia and South Pacific Islands. 
It is chewed as a quid, which is wrapped in betel leaves, slaked lime, and 
tobacco. In Myanmar, 18% of women and 59% of men aged between 15 and 49 
years chew betel-quid, and 2 in 5 men and 1 in 5 women chewed 10 or more 
pieces of betel-quid every day (Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS) and ICF, 
2017).  
Chewing betel-quid has a strong link to chronic diseases such as oral cancer 
(Lin et al., 2008; Wen et al., 2010), metabolic syndrome (Yen et al., 2006), 
hypertension (Heck et al., 2012), and obesity (Chang et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009), 
as well as lower life expectancy (Lan et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2015).  Although 
betel-quid consumption and the prevalence of betel-quid related diseases are 
high in many countries, surprisingly, there is no reliable empirical paper in the 
literature that investigates the economic impact of chewing betel-quid. 
In isolating the causal effect of chewing betel-quid on poverty, we have many 
empirical challenges such as reverse causality between chewing betel-quid and 
poverty, unobserved characteristics, and measurement error. To address the 
potential endogeneity in household decision-making on chewing betel-quid, we 
exploit household and community characteristics as instruments.  
We construct instrumental variables by exploiting laws, geo-climatic suitability 
of betel-nut cultivation and customs of religion to discover the impacts of 
chewing betel-quid on poverty. In Myanmar, basic education (up to a lower 
secondary level) is free and compulsory under constitutional law, and chewing 
or selling betel-quid has been strictly prohibited by law in school since 2006, 
therefore, we use the number of school children (up to a lower secondary level) 
in a household as an instrument for the quantity of household betel-quid 
consumption. 
We conduct a robustness check by using an additional instrument - dummy for 
the existence of a public health facility in the same village/ward in which a 
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household lives. Anti-betel-quid campaigns, such as hanging vinyl posters to 
discourage chewing betel-quid as shown in Figure 3-1, are usually initiated by 
a public health care centre. Therefore, we assume that the existence of a health 
care centre in the same village/ward in which a household lives will influence 
the household’s decision on betel-quid consumption.  
A wide range of economic research commonly uses instruments such as 
household characteristics including: number of presence of children (Jones, 
Miller, & Salkever, 1999; Van Ours, 2004), religiosity (Auld, 2018; Kaestner, 
1991, 1994; Register & Williams, 2019; Renna, 2007), and laws and policies as 
instruments to examine the relationships between the use of addictive substances 
(e.g. tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine) and their consequences (e.g., criminal 
activity, reduced incomes, enhanced use of health facility, reduced education) 
(French & Popovici, 2008).  
We conduct additional robustness check by implementing instrumental 
variables with the interaction between household’s religious affiliation and 
geo-climatic suitability of betel-nut cultivation. As the betel nut can only be 
cultivated in certain geo-climatic conditions(Staples & Bevacqua, 2006), we 
assume that the regions where betel nut is cultivable, consumption is higher. As 
Buddhists believe betel-quid is an essential delicacy, particularly in social and 
religious ceremonies, they tend to consume betel-quid more than in other 
religions.  
Secondly, this paper turns to the analysis of the underlying channels of the 
effect of chewing betel-quid on poverty. To estimate the economic cost of 
chewing betel-quid, we follow established ways of estimating the cost of 
addiction to substances like alcohol, smoking, and illicit drugs in previous 
studies. Costs have been divided into two main categories: (i) direct costs - 
health care, research and prevention, crime and law enforcement, property 
damage or loss, administration, welfare or social work, addicted substance; and 
(ii) indirect costs - early mortality costs, decreased productivity costs due to 
absenteeism, job loss or early retirement costs (Thavorncharoensap et al., 
2009). As a direct channel, we use spending on betel-quid consumption, i.e. an 
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opportunity cost limiting the budget available for household spending on other 
goods and services, and household medical expenditure. In addition, we 
examine the losses of employment due to illness as an indirect channel. 
(Thavorncharoensap et al., 2009) 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we present 
data and the way of implementing of different poverty measures. Section 3.3 
describes the OLS regression of household betel-quid consumption on poverty 
incidences. In section 3.4, we provide detailed explanations on instrumental 
variables, its results for poverty incidences and the underlying mechanism are 
described in section 3.5, and the assessment for the identification strategy is 
described in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.  
3.2 Data and Poverty Measures 
3.2.1  Data  
We use information from a nationally representative household survey 
conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In 2009 and 
2010, UNDP conducted two rounds of surveys for the Integrated Household 
Living Conditions Assessment (IHLCA). In this study, we use the 2009 survey 
only because 2010 survey does not contain the education information, which is 
used as a main instrument in this paper.  
The IHLCA household survey collected information from 18660 households. 
The survey used a stratified sampling design with 62 districts and two 
townships as first stage sampling units. In the second stage, wards or villages 
were randomly taken from the selected township in accordance with the 
numbers of households. Finally, twelve households were randomly selected 
from each ward or village by using Probability Proportionate Estimated Size 
with Replacement (PPES).  
We use the quantity of household betel-quid consumption, food consumption 
expenditure, non-food consumption expenditure and demographic 
characteristics to study the impact of betel-quid consumption on poverty. Table 
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3.1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in this paper. 
3.2.2  Poverty Incidences  
We use three different measures of poverty incidence: the food poverty 
incidence measured on household food consumption expenditure, the relative 
poverty incidence measured on the aggregate expenditure on food and non-food 
commodities, and the absolute poverty incidence measured by using the 
international poverty line—US$ 1.9 per day. Poverty lines such as food poverty 
line and relative poverty line are defined by UNDP and are calculated by using 
information of the Integrated Households and Living Condition Assessment 
surveys (IHLCA 2009-2010).  
The food poverty line is defined based on the reference households' average 
food spending, which is the quantity of cash needed to pay for a food basket 
that meets the family members' minimum caloric demands. The reference 
households are those in the second quartile of total consumption expenditure.  
It is important to adjust the composition of households by age and size to be 
able to compare spending on food consumption across households, as children 
in a family consume less than adults. We use equation (3.1) to adjust the 
household adult equivalent scales: 
AEF! =  MA! +  α!FA! +  α!C!
!
, (3.1) 
Where, “ AEF! ” is numbers of adult equivalent for food consumption 
expenditure in household “j”, “MA!” denotes number of adult-males aged 15+ 
in household “j”, “FA! ” presents number of adult-females aged 15+ in 
household “j”, “C!” denotes number of children aged<=14 in household “j”, 
“α!” represents costs of a female adult relative to those of a male adult, “α!” 
represents costs of a child relative to those of a male adult, “θ” presents the 
elasticity of adult equivalent with respect to effective size. α!,α!, and θ are 
set to 0.9, 0.7 and 0.9 respectively based on nutrition norms (Deaton & Zaidi, 
2002). We, then define the dummy variable for poverty incidence in which “1” 
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indicates an adult in a household “j”, which is below the poverty line, “0” 
otherwise. 
The relative poverty line is defined on the basis of minimum food spending to 
meet caloric demands, plus reasonable non-food spending to meet fundamental 
needs, which is calculated by using information of a reference household. In 
order to compare non-food consumption expenditure across households, we use 
equation (3.2) to adjust the household economies of scale and to take account of 
the public goods aspects of some commodities. In addition, children usually 
have a more limited list of products they consume. 
AENF! = ( A! +   αC!)!, (3.2) 
Where, “AENF! ” describes the number of adult equivalent for non-food 
expenditure in household “j”, “A!” denotes number of adults aged 15+ in 
household “j”, “C!” denotes number of children aged <=14 in household “j”, 
“α” represents non-food cost of a child relative to that of a male adult, “θ” is 
elasticity of adult equivalents with respect to effective size between 0 and 1. 
α  and θ are set to 0.3 and 0.9 respectively based on nutrition norms (Deaton 
& Zaidi, 2002). We, then define the dummy for relative poverty incidence 
based on the household aggregate expenditure in which “1” indicates an adult 
in a household “j”, which is below the relative poverty line, “0” otherwise. 
The absolute poverty incidence is calculated by using the international poverty 
line of US$ 1.9 per day. We define dummy variables for the poverty incidence 
in which “1” denotes total expenditure per day of a person in household “j”, 
which is below US$ 1.9 (1900 Kyats- local currency unit) and “0” otherwise.   
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Table 3-1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
Dummy for food poverty incidence (Below 
poverty line=1) 
0.463 0.499 0 1 
Dummy for poverty incidence (Below 
poverty line=1) 
0.439 0.496 0 1 
Dummy for absolute poverty incidence 
(Below poverty line=1) 
0.714 0.281 0 1 
Log of per capita food consumption 
expenditure per day (Kyats) 
6.626 0.636 0.273 11.087 
Log of per capita total expenditure per day 
(Kyats) 
7.021 0.625 3.507 11.472 
Log of household health expenditure in six 
months (Kyats) 
1.500 3.558 0 23.942 
Log of household’s working days per week 0.879 0.409 0 3.091 
# of HH members who have chronic illness 0.127 0.465 0 9 
Log of quantity of household betel-quid 
consumption per month (Kg) 
0.879 1.543 0 7.314 
# of HH members currently attending school 
(up to a lower secondary level) 
0.929 1.078 0 8 
Dummy for existence of public health 
facility in the same village/ward (Yes=1) 
0.088 0.284 0 1 
Buddhist household in betel-nut suitable 
regions 
0.239 0.426 0 1 
Non-Buddhist households in betel-nut 
suitable regions  
0.036 0.185 0 1 
Households in betel-nut non-suitable region 
(Omitted category) 
0.720 0.446 0 1 
Gender of household head (Female=1) 0.202 0.401 0 1 
Education attainment of household head 5.252 2.769 0 13 
# of household members 5.104 2.237 1 23 
# of children aged <=5 0.326 0.593 0 5 
# of seniors aged 65+  0.306	 0.578	 0	 4	
Dummy for rural household (Yes=1) 0.703 0.457 0 1 
Observations 18567	
Notes: 1 US$ is approximately equal to 1000 Kyats (Local currency) in 2009.  
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3.3 Chewing Betel-quid and Poverty: OLS Estimates 
3.3.1 OLS Estimates 
Table 3.2 reports estimates from the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression of 
different measures of poverty incidence. To estimate the effects of betel-quid 
consumption on poverty, we use equation (3.3): 
Y! =  β! +  β!ln_betel! + X!!β!+ δ!+∈!, (3.3)  
where, “i” denotes a household and 𝐘𝐢 represents the food poverty incidence, 
the relative poverty incidence, and the absolute poverty incidences. “𝐥𝐧_𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐢” 
represents the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption per month. 
‘𝐗𝐢!’ includes # of household members, # of children aged<=5, # of seniors aged 
65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s education and gender. “𝛅𝐣” 
denotes the dummies for fifteen administrative regions. 
The dependent variables in Columns (1)–(3) are dummy variables for the 
poverty incidences in which one indicates that a household is below the poverty 
line, and zero takes otherwise. The coefficients of the log of quantity of 
household betel-quid consumption represent the effects of chewing betel-quid 
on poverty. Estimates show a negative impact on the food poverty incidence 
and relative poverty incidence, but no effects on the absolute poverty incidence.  
We cannot interpret the OLS estimates as causal effects of chewing betel-quid 
on poverty for a number of reasons. First, the estimate may be biased due to a 
potential reverse causality problem, for example, the poor generally have lower 
education and awareness of health, so tend to consume betel-quid more and it 
leads them into deep poverty. The linear regression model may also be 
incorrectly specified because a household in extreme poverty may not have 
enough resource to spend on betel-quid. Moreover, there will be omitted 
factors, which may be correlated with betel-quid consumption and poverty. 
Finally, respondents are asked to recall the quantity of betel-quid consumed in 
the last thirty-days, and some respondents have difficulties recalling accurately 
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the quantity consumed in the last month. All of these problems will be solvable 
if we have instruments for the quantity of household betel-quid consumption.  
Table 3-2: OLS Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3)  
Dummy for 
food poverty 
incidence  
Dummy for 
relative 
poverty 
incidence 
Dummy for 
absolute 
poverty 
incidence 
Log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption 
-0.028*** -0.011*** -0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15098 15098 15098 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district 
level (there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household. The dependent variables in 
columns (1)–(3) are dummies for poverty incidence, which equals one if a household is below the 
poverty line, zero if otherwise. 
“Household controls” include # of household members, # of children aged<=5, # of seniors aged 
65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s education and gender. In all regressions, we 
control for dummies for fifteen regions.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
3.4 Chewing Betel-quid and Poverty: 2SLS Estimates 
3.4.1 Instrumental variables 
The approach we use to investigate the causal impact of chewing betel-quid on 
poverty is using instruments that are correlated with the quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption, but uncorrelated with other unobserved household 
characteristics that are important to household socio-economic characteristics. 
We use the number of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a 
household (Jones et al., 1999; Van Ours, 2004) as an instrument for the quantity 
of household betel-quid consumption. 
The validity of the instrument - numbers of school children in a household - 
relies on an assumption that implies the household decision to send children to 
school is independent of other household characteristics, e.g., household wealth 
and distance from school, but strongly correlated with the decision of 
household’s betel-quid consumption. As basic education (up to a lower 
secondary level) in Myanmar is free and compulsory under the constitutional 
	
69 
 
law (Myanmar Ministry of Information, 2008), we assume that the decision to 
send children to school is exogenous to other household characteristics. As the 
gross enrolment rate in basic education increased to 99.7 percent after 
enforcement, we assume that most households send their children to school and 
the law is enforced well.  
We also assume that the household decision to consume betel-quid may be 
adversely influenced by the number of school children in a household for a 
number of reasons. In 2006, chewing betel-quid was banned in schools and 
public health care centres by law to control consumption. Furthermore, 
betel-nut shops were banned from selling within 50 meters of school by law 
(The State Peace and Development Council, 2006). In addition, eighty School 
Health Teams under the supervision of the Public Health Department visit 
schools to educate students and teachers regarding betel-quid related diseases. 
We assume that school children may share knowledge gained from school with 
their parents at home and it will increase the awareness of betel-quid related 
diseases. According to the social power theory, children may influence their 
parents’ decisions like food purchasing or consumption (Carrillo, 
Gonzalez-Sparks, & Salcedo, 2018; Turner, Kelly, & McKenna, 2006); 
therefore, school children may encourage their parents to stop or reduce 
betel-quid consumption. 
We use equation (3.4) to investigate the causal impact of chewing betel-quid on 
poverty by using the two-stage least squares. The log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption, “lnbetel” is regarded as endogenous, and then modeled 
as:  
lnbetel! =  β! +  β!Z′! + X!!β!+δ!+ ∈!, (3.4)  
where, variable “Z!” stands for the instruments we used in this study. 𝐗𝐢! 
describes the “Household controls” including # of household members, # of 
children aged<=5, # of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, and 
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household head’s education and gender. 𝛅𝐢 denotes the dummies for fifteen 
regions. 
3.4.2 The Validity of the Instrument  
The validity of our main instrument - the number of school children (up to a 
lower secondary level) in a household - depends on the assumption that implies 
the instrument is uncorrelated with the household’s other substance use e.g., 
smoking, and alcohol consumption. As tobacco and alcohol are also strictly 
prohibited in the school environment, the number of school children might 
negatively influence household alcohol consumption or smoking and it would 
lead the household to a better economic condition. We explore the relationship 
between the instrument and household’s other addictive substance use e.g., 
tobacco and alcohol, with OLS regression (Reported in appendix table C-1) to 
assess the possibility of these concerns. Estimates show no correlation between 
the number of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a household 
and household’s smoking or alcohol consumption.  
A possible explanation why we do not find the link between the instrument and 
other addictive substances, such as alcohol consumption and smoking, but find 
a negative relationship with betel-quid consumption is that alcohol is not 
religiously and socially accepted, and people even in very remote areas may be 
aware of the effects of smoking on health. However, chewing betel-quid is still 
believed to be a cultural and traditional delicacy and the awareness of betel 
related diseases is still very low in Myanmar. Therefore, the knowledge 
conveyed by school children might increase the awareness of betel-quid related 
diseases and encourage parents and other household members to stop and 
reduce chewing betel-quid.  
We also assume that the number of household members currently attending 
school is uncorrelated with the household conditions of being below poverty 
lines. Nevertheless, the assumption for the exclusion restrictions will be invalid 
if the households in extreme poverty do not send their children to school 
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although the basic education (up to a secondary level) is free and compulsory. 
However, the validity of our assumption for exclusion restrictions can be 
supported with two reasons. Firstly, the law stipulates that basic education is 
not only compulsory but also free; therefore, households do not need to spend 
at all on education if the children are below the secondary level. Gross 
enrolment rate in basic education increased to 99.7 percent after enforcement 
and it shows the law is enforced well.  
Secondly, if there is a direct relationship between the number of school children 
and the conditions of being below poverty lines, the poorer a household is, the 
lower probability of sending children to school. Then it leads to more betel-quid 
consumption and higher probability of being below poverty lines. However, the 
OLS estimates in Table 3.2 suggest that it is less likely to have a direct 
relationship between our main instrument and poverty because the results 
indicate that non-poor households consume betel-quid more relative to the poor. 
We conduct an additional check by adding the instrument in the regressions 
directly together with the endogenous variable; the results indicate that there is 
no relationship between the instrument and poverty. (Reported in appendix 
table C-3 & C-4) 
3.5  Main Results  
3.5.1 Poverty Incidence 
Table 3.3 reports the two-stage least-square estimates. Panel A reports 2SLS 
estimates of equation (3.3) and Panel B describes a prevailing first-stage 
connection between the instrument and the log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption of equation (3.4). The dependent variables in columns 
(1)–(3) are dummy variables for the food poverty incidence, relative poverty 
incidence and absolute poverty incidence respectively. In all specifications, we 
control for the dummies for fifteen regions. In addition, we control for 
household characteristics including number of household members, number of 
children aged<=5, number of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, 
education and gender of the household head.  
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Coefficients of the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption, 
reported in columns (1)–(3) of Panel A are positively correlated with poverty 
and statistically different from zero, which is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies of tobacco use (John et al., 2012, 2011; Liu et al., 2006). 
Estimates indicate that if a household consumes one percent more of betel-quid 
in a month, the probability of being below the food poverty line, relative 
poverty and absolute poverty line increase 0.697 percentage points, 0.581 
percentage points and 0.175 percentage points on average respectively.  
The two-stage least-squares estimates indicate that all the observed negative 
correlations between the quantity of household betel-quid consumption and 
poverty in OLS regressions are due to omitted-variables bias and the point 
estimates turn to positive ones when these biases are controlled for. Sagan test 
results in Table 3.5 of Panel B show that the assumption for exclusion 
restriction is valid. 
The direction and magnitude of 2SLS estimates are different from OLS 
estimates for a number of reasons. Firstly, the poor generally have lower 
education and awareness of betel-quid related diseases, so they tend to consume 
more relative to the non-poor. On the other hand, households in extreme 
poverty may not have enough resources to spend on betel-quid and it may lead 
to less consumption. Due to the reversed causality problem, the OLS estimates 
indicate the negative correlation and it reflects the fact that non-poor 
households may consume betel-quid more relative to poor. When we use the 
instrument for the quantity of betel-quid consumption, the estimates are purged 
of all bias caused by the reversed causality and incorrectly specified linear 
regression model. Secondly, and most importantly, the OLS estimates might 
correlate with the error term, as we cannot control for factors like weather 
shock, primary income source, and assets ownership, which are important to 
household economic conditions. The OLS estimates might be biased due to the 
omission of important confounding variables.   
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Table 3-3: 2SLS Estimates for Poverty Incidences 
Dependent Variable= Dummy for 
Poverty Incidence (Below poverty 
line=1) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Food poverty 
incidence  
Relative 
poverty 
incidence 
Absolute 
poverty 
incidence 
    
Panel A: Two-stage least squares 
Log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption 
0.697*** 0.581*** 0.175** 
(0.229) (0.193) (0.077) 
    
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
   
Panel B: First-stage for the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption 
# of school children (up to a lower 
secondary level) in a household 
-0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 12.349 12.349 12.349 
Observations 15098 15098 15098 
Notes: 2SLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district 
level (there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household. The dependent variables in 
columns (1)–(3) are dummies for poverty incidence, which equals one if a household is below the 
poverty line, zero takes otherwise. We use # of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a 
household as an instrument for the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption. 
“Household controls” include # of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of 
seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s education and gender. In all 
regressions, we control for dummies for fifteen regions.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
3.5.2  Channels 
We also explore the underlying mechanisms of how chewing betel-quid affects 
poverty through both the direct channel - crowding-out effects of betel-quid 
consumption and associated health expenditure - and the indirect channel - loss 
of participation in the household workforce due to illness. 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports 2SLS results and Panel B the corresponding first 
stage. Our findings support the previous studies in literature that found spending 
on an addictive substance like tobacco and alcohol crowds out household’s 
expenditure on vital needs (Busch et al., 2004; John et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 
2002). Columns (1)–(2) report the estimates of crowding-out effects of 
betel-quid expenditure on household food expenditure and total expenditure 
respectively. Coefficients of the natural log of household betel-quid 
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consumption suggest that food expenditure and non-food expenditure decrease 
0.378 percentage points and 0.863 percentage points on average respectively if a 
household chews one percent more betel-quid in thirty days. 
Table 3-4: 2SLS Estimates for Underlying Channels  
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Direct Channel  Indirect Channel 
Log of 
food 
expenditure 
Log of 
total 
expenditure 
Log of 
health 
expenditure 
 Log of 
working 
days 
# of HH 
members 
with 
chronic 
illness   
Panel A: Two-stage least squares 
Log of quantity of 
household betel-quid 
consumption 
-0.378* -0.863*** 1.974*  -2.402*** 0.224** 
(0.215) (0.287) (1.027)  (0.676) (0.108) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
       
Panel B: First-stage for log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption 
# of school children (up 
to a lower secondary 
level) in a household 
-0.050*** -0.046*** -0.046***  -0.045*** -0.046*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.012) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-test 14.465 12.328 12.349  11.463 12.349 
Observations 15031 15095 15098  14903 15098 
Notes: 2SLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district level 
(there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(2) 
are the natural log of household food consumption expenditure and aggregate food and non-food 
expenditure, which are adjusted for household composition and household size (economies of scales), in 
column (3) is the natural log of household health expenditure, in column (4) is the natural log of 
household’s working days, in column (5) is # of household members who have chronic illness. We use # 
of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a household as an instrument for the log of quantity 
of household betel-quid consumption.  
“Household controls” include # of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of seniors 
aged 65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s education and gender. In all regressions, we 
control for dummies for fifteen regions.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Estimates on the natural log of household health expenditure reported in Column 
(3) indicate that the 1.974 percentage points increase in household health 
expenditure is associated with one percent increase in the quantity of betel-quid 
consumption. In Column (4), estimates for the natural log of the household’s 
working days per week are reported. The data are collected from the respondents 
who are aged between 15 and 65 and not currently attending school. The result 
suggests that one percent more of chewing betel-quid is linked with 2.402 
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percentage points decrease in the household’s working day. In line with the 
evidence in literature mentioned that chewing betel-quid causes chronic 
diseases, we discover a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
number of household members suffering from chronic disease, which is 
presented in Column (5).  
3.6 Robustness Check 
In order to conduct robustness checks, we use a dummy variable for the 
existence of a public health facility in the same village/ward in which a 
household lives as an instrument for the quantity of household betel-quid 
consumption.	
In Myanmar, the decision to implement a public health facility mainly depends 
on the size of the locality and the distance from an existing health care center. 
Therefore, we assume that the existence of a public health care center in the 
same village/ward in which a household lives is exogenous to household 
characteristics and other regional economic factors that may influence the 
outcome variables. In addition, as the pictorial warning can effectively change 
behaviour such as intention to quit and quit attempts like, the pictorial warning 
on cigarette packs (Brewer et al., 2016), most public health care centres in 
Myanmar conduct poster campaigns as shown in Figure 3-1 to reduce 
betel-quid consumption. Therefore, households in the same village/ward, which 
has a public health facility, may often see the posters hanging at the entrance of 
the health care center, and it may discourage betel-quid consumption.	
We use equation (3.4) to conduct the robustness check with two instruments - 
numbers of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a household and 
dummy for the existence of a public health facility in the same village/ward in 
which a household lives.  
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Figure 3-1: Poster of Anti-betel Campaign 
	
 
 
Table 3.5 presents the first set of robustness checks. 2SLS estimates in 
Columns (1)-(8) indicate that, even using additional instrument, the estimated 
effects of betel-quid are consistent with the baseline estimates. The P-values of 
Sargan test reassures the exogeneity of the instruments, though in some models 
the P values are slightly smaller than 0.1 
An extensive set of empirical research commonly used instruments such as 
religiosity and state level characteristic as instruments to examine the causal 
impact of using an addictive substance on different outcomes such as income, 
crime, use of health facility, and lower education (French & Popovici, 2008). 
We use household religious affiliation and geo-climatic suitability of betel nut 
cultivation to construct instruments to conduct an additional robustness check. 
Betel nut can only be cultivated under certain geo-climatic conditions. It 
requires annual rainfall in a range from 750 millimeters to 4500 millimeters and 
it can only be cultivated below 1000 meters of mean sea level. The ideal 
temperature is the range between 10°C to 40°C (Staples & Bevacqua, 2006). As 
betel-nut cultivation depends on specific geo-climatic conditions, we assume 
that the decision to cultivate betel nut is exogenous and uncorrelated to any 
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regional economic condition. We construct betel-nut suitable regions based on 
three geo-climate conditions for betel-nut cultivation: annual rainfall and 
temperature by using the information from Myanmar Climate Report (Zin et al., 
2017), and regional average elevation data (NASA’s SRTM data). If a region is 
coincident with the three geo-climate conditions, we define the region as a 
betel-nut suitable region. We have five betel-nut suitable regions out of fifteen 
in our sample. Our proposed mechanism of the consumption variations among 
regions is the difference in price of betel-quid. The price will be higher in a 
region in which betel-nut cannot be cultivated due to the transportation cost and 
we assume a higher price may hinder or discourage betel-quid consumption. 
Most Buddhists in Myanmar believe that betel-quid is an essential delicacy to 
religious ceremonies and other social occasions, such as a traditional wedding 
ceremony (Sein, Swe, Toe, Zaw, & Sein, 2014). The OLS estimates (Reported 
in appendix table C-2) indicate that Buddhist households consume more 
betel-quid relative to other religions. Therefore, we exploit the variation in 
household betel-quid consumption determined by customs of religions to 
construct instrument variables (Auld, 2018; Kaestner, 1991, 1994; Register & 
Williams, 2019; Renna, 2007). In this study, we assume that household 
religious affiliation is uncorrelated with socioeconomic conditions. However, 
there is a favorable relationship between religion and economic growth in many 
empirical articles (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 
2003; Wang & Lin, 2014). On the other hand, some studies found contradicting 
evidences, which indicate that a particular religious affiliation has no robust 
effects on economic performance (Durlauf, Kourtellos, & Tan, 2009; Noland, 
2005).  
In order to avoid the potential endogeneity in household religious affiliation and 
classification of betel-nut suitable regions, we interact dummy for household 
religious affiliation and dummy for betel-nut suitable region. We construct 
three dummy variables: Buddhist household in betel-nut suitable regions; 
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non-Buddhist household in betel-nut suitable regions; and other household in 
betel-nut non-suitable regions (Omitted category).  
Table 3.6 presents results from the robustness checks by using different 
instrumental variables. The 2SLS estimates in this setting are smaller than the 
baseline results, but they are also economically and statistically significant and 
still consistent with the baseline estimates.  
With reasonable assumptions, IV estimates provide the average treatment effect 
for "compliers", however, people whose participation may change with 
different instruments. With two different instruments; therefore, the two sets of 
compliers are going to be somewhat different. In other words, instrumental 
variables provide an estimate for a specific group—namely, people whose 
behavior can be manipulated by instruments (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). As the 
IV estimates are Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE), if the compliers are 
different due to the using of different IVs, the size of coefficients may be 
somewhat different. 
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Table 3-5: Robustness Check I  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Food 
poverty 
Relative 
poverty  
Absolute 
poverty  
Log of food 
Exp 
Log of 
total Exp 
Log of 
health Exp 
Log of 
working 
days 
# of HH 
members 
who have 
chronic 
illness   
Panel A: Two-stage least squares       
Log of quantity of 
household betel-quid 
consumption 
0.576*** 0.412*** 0.140** -0.628*** -0.646*** 1.052* -1.558*** 0.242** 
(0.162) (0.126) (0.054) (0.235) (0.185) (0.631) (0.363) (0.102) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First-stage for log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption    
# of school children (up to 
a lower secondary level) in 
a household 
-0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.049*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Dummy for existence of 
public health facility in the 
Village/ward (Yes=1) 
-0.110** -0.110** -0.110** -0.110** -0.110** -0.099** -0.121** -0.110** 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.010 10.215 10.010 10.450 10.010 
Sargan test (P-value) 0.129 0.113 0.062 0.723 0.189 0.067 0.088 0.0954 
Observations 15098 15098 15098 15098 15095 15098 14903 15098 
Notes: Notes: 2SLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district level (there are 62 districts). 
The unit of observations is a household. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) are dummies for poverty incidence, which equals to 
one if a household is below the poverty line, zero takes otherwise, in columns (4)–(5) are the natural log of household food consumption 
expenditure and total consumption expenditures, which are adjusted for household composition and household size (economies of 
scales), in column (6) is the natural log of household health expenditure, in column (7) is the natural log of household’s working days, in 
column (8) is # of household members who have chronic illness. We use # of school children (up to a lower secondary level) in a 
household and dummy for the existence of public health facility in the same village/ward in which a household lives as instruments for 
the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption. 
“Household controls” include # of household members, # of children aged<=5, # of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, 
household head’s education and gender. In all regressions, we control for dummies for fifteen regions. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
	
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-6: Robustness Check II 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Food 
poverty 
Relative 
poverty  
Absolute 
poverty  
Log of 
Food 
Exp 
Log of 
total Exp 
Log of 
health 
Exp 
Log of 
working 
days 
# of HH 
members 
who have 
chronic 
illness   
Panel A: Two-stage least squares      
Log of quantity of 
household betel-quid 
consumption 
0.252** 0.290** 0.107* -0.348** -0.411** 0.940*** -0.256* 0.100* 
(0.127) (0.121) (0.063) (0.170) (0.179) (0.199) (0.142) (0.054) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First-stage for log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption  
Dummy for Buddhist 
household in betel-nut 
suitable regions  (Yes=1) 
0.787*** 0.856*** 0.856*** 0.856*** 0.857**
* 
0.980*** 0.838*** 0.809*** 
(0.180) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.220) (0.157) (0.161) 
Dummy for Non-Buddhist 
household in betel-nut 
suitable regions (Yes=1) 
0.416** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471**
* 
0.491*** 0.457*** 0.454*** 
(0.169) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.169) (0.158) (0.156) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological zones FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 67.976 88.473 88.473 88.519 88.512 201.307 77.144 73.529 
Sargan test (P-value) 0.874 0.457 0.228 0.871 0.826 0.348 0.211 0.526 
Observations 12328 12328 12328 12312 12325 24342 12328 12328 
Notes: 2SLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district level (there are 62 districts). The 
unit of observations is a household. The dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) are dummies for poverty incidence, which equals to one 
if a household is below the poverty line, zero takes otherwise, in columns (4)–(5) are the natural log of household food consumption 
expenditure and total expenditure, which are adjusted for household composition and household size (economies of scales), in column 
(6) is the natural log of household health expenditure, in column (7) is the natural log of household’s working days, in column (8) is # 
of household members who have chronic illness. We use three categorical variables: Buddhism household in betel-nut suitable regions, 
Non-Buddhism households in betel-nut suitable regions, and households in betel-nut non-suitable region (Omitted category) as 
instruments for the log of quantity of household betel-quid consumption. Betel-suitable regions are classified on fifteen administrative 
regions. 
“Household controls” include # of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural 
household, household head’s education and gender. In all regressions, we control for dummies for fifteen regions. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This paper studies the impacts of chewing betel-quid on poverty in 
Myanmar. We use household consumption information to determine whether 
a household is below the poverty line. We use three different poverty lines to 
discover the effects of chewing betel-quid on poverty: the food poverty line, 
the monetary value of the minimum caloric requirement; the relative poverty 
line, the basic requirement of food and non-food items; and the absolute 
poverty line, the international poverty line calculated at US$ 1.9 a day. In 
addition, we explore the underlying causes of chewing betel-quid on poverty 
through the direct channel - crowding-out effects of betel-quid consumption 
and associated health expenditure - and the indirect channel - loss of 
participation in the household workforce due to illness. To address the 
potential endogeneity in a household’s decisions on chewing betel-quid, we 
exploit household and community characteristics as instruments.  
The results indicate that the substance addiction, chewing betel-quid, indeed 
pushes households into poverty. One percent increase in quantity of 
household betel-quid consumption in thirty days is associated with the 
increase in probability of being below the food poverty line, relative poverty 
line and absolute poverty line 0.697, 0.581 and 0.175 percentage points 
respectively. The findings also show that spending on betel-quid crowds out 
household expenditures on food and non-food items. In addition, the higher 
health expenditure and lower working days in a household is associated with 
higher betel-quid consumption. As chewing betel-quid push households into 
poverty; reducing betel-quid consumption would not only be a public health 
policy, it would also be a policy to reduce poverty. 
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Appendix C 
Table C- 1: Analyzing the Validity of Instrument 
 
(1) (2) 
Log of household 
expenditure on 
alcohol 
consumption  
Log of household 
expenditure on 
smoking 
# of HH members currently attending school (up 
to a lower secondary level) 
0.030 0.003 
(0.027) (0.028) 
Household Controls Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes 
Observations 15098 15098 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district 
level (there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household.	We use household’s spending on 
alcohol beverages instead of quantity in order to account for different types of alcoholic beverages 
such as beer, toddy alcohol, local alcoholic beverages, imported alcoholic beverages, and rice wine 
consumed by households in a month. “Household controls” include # of household members, number 
of children aged<=5, number of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s 
education and gender. In all regressions, we control for dummies for fifteen regions.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table C- 2: Religious Affiliation and Betel-quid Consumption 
 
(1) 
Log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption  
Dummy for household religious affiliation 
(Buddhist-HH=1) 
0.170*** 
(0.047) 
Household Controls Yes 
Observations 14646 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported with cluster standard error in parentheses. “Household controls” 
include # of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of seniors aged 65+, dummy 
for rural household, household head’s education and gender. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table C- 3: The Validity of Instrument (OLS) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dummy for 
food poverty 
incidence  
Dummy for 
relative 
poverty 
incidence 
Dummy for 
absolute 
poverty 
incidence 
Log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption 
-0.034*** -0.018*** -0.003* 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
# of HH members currently 
attending school (up to a lower 
secondary level) 
-0.008 0.004 0.004 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14270 14270 14270 
Notes: OLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at district 
level (there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household.	 “Household controls” include # 
of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural 
household, household head’s education and gender. In all regressions, we control for dummies for 
fifteen regions. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table C- 4: The Validity of Instrument (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable= Dummy 
for Poverty Incidence (Below 
poverty line=1) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Food poverty 
incidence  
Relative 
poverty 
incidence 
Absolute 
poverty 
incidence 
    
Panel A: Two-stage least squares 
Log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption 
0.249** 0.372* 0.108* 
(0.126) (0.201) (0.062) 
# of school children (up to a 
lower secondary level) in a HH 
0.012 -0.010 -0.005 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
   
Panel B: First-stage for the log of quantity of household betel-quid 
consumption 
Dummy for Buddhist household 
in betel-nut suitable regions 
(Yes=1) 
0.797*** 0.766*** 0.866*** 
(0.181) (0.258) (0.175) 
Dummy for Non-Buddhist 
household in betel-nut suitable 
regions (Yes=1) 
0.418** 0.364** 0.473*** 
(0.169) (0.146) (0.167) 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 69.024 64.070 89.677 
Sargan test (P-value) 0.893 0.831 0.237 
Observations 12328 13488 12328 
Notes: 2SLS estimates are reported with standard error in parentheses, which is clustered at 
district level (there are 62 districts). The unit of observations is a household. The dependent 
variables in columns (1)–(3) are dummies for poverty incidence, which is equal to one if a 
household is below the poverty line, zero takes otherwise. We use # of school children (up to a 
lower secondary level) in a household as an instrument for the log of quantity of household 
betel-quid consumption. 
“Household controls” include # of household members, number of children aged<=5, number of 
seniors aged 65+, dummy for rural household, household head’s education and gender. In all 
regressions, we control for dummies for fifteen regions. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
